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For the last two centuries, individual states and U.S. territories have been entrusted with primary responsibility for regulating property, casualty, and life insurance markets.1 Under
this system, each jurisdiction has its own insurance regulator
and set of insurance laws. Turf battles among these fifty-six insurance jurisdictions are rare, as they each enjoy exclusive authority over any insurance business that takes place within

1. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarranFerguson Act of 1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation,
68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 20–26 (1993) (outlining the broad scope of state regulation of insurance in the context of the McCarran Ferguson Act’s “business of
insurance” exception); Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United
States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 629–34 (1999) (discussing the development of state regulation of insurance).
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their physical boundaries.2 As a result, their relationship is
characterized much more by cooperation than competition.3
To its critics, this patchwork approach to insurance regulation is antiquated and inefficient.4 It requires multistate insurers to conform their practices to different regulatory regimes in
different states,5 inhibits cooperation between American and
international insurance regulators,6 and allows state politics to
dictate counterproductive regulatory strategies.7 Given this
nonexhaustive litany of complaints about state insurance regulation, it is hardly surprising that insurance regulatory reform
2. See ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 112–13
(3d ed. 2007) (“[E]ach state separately regulates the business of insurance.”).
3. See Elizabeth F. Brown, The Development of International Norms for
Insurance Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 953, 984 (2009) (“Traditionally,
states have operated their insurance commissions as regulatory monopolies
and have not engaged in regulatory competition, which exists to some degree
between state and federal government agencies that issue bank charters, and
among states for the incorporation of businesses.”).
4. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Single-License Solution,
REG., Winter 2008, at 36, 36–38. See generally OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTERING AND REGULATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES (Peter J. Wallison ed., 2000)
(documenting the history of insurance regulation and the implications for an
optional federal charter); THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 13–51, 117–43 (Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein eds., 2009)
(outlining the history of insurance regulation and explaining why reform is
necessary).
5. See Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein, Efficiency Implications of Alternative Regulatory Structures for Insurance, in OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTERING AND REGULATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES, supra note 4, at 79, 109–
11. See generally Robert W. Klein, The Insurance Industry and Its Regulation:
An Overview, in THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 4, at 13, 31–42 [hereinafter Klein, Overview] (outlining the
current framework of state insurance regulation). Not only does this produce
costs for the industry, but it also creates inefficiencies in the regulatory
process itself, as states free-ride off of each other when it comes to regulating
multistate insurers. See Martin F. Grace & Richard D. Phillips, The Allocation
of Governmental Regulatory Authority: Federalism and the Case of Insurance
Regulation, 74 J. RISK & INS. 207, 235 (2007).
6. See Brown, supra note 3, at 972, 987–88 (noting that the lack of insurance uniformity in the United States inhibits adoption of international insurance standards and makes it difficult to conduct negotiations for such standards).
7. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 38 (noting that large, lucrative
states can impose inefficiencies into the market); J. David Cummins et al.,
Regulation, Political Influence and the Price of Automobile Insurance, 20 J.
INS. REG. 9, 43–44 (2001) (using statistics to show that politics can negatively
influence car insurance prices); Martin F. Grace & Hal S. Scott, An Optional
Federal Charter for Insurance: Rationale and Design, in THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 4, at 55, 59 (noting
that states will regulate in a way most salient to their voters).
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has received renewed attention in the wake of the global financial panic of 2008 and the federal bailout of American International Group (AIG).8
One of the central ideas to emerge out of this public debate
is that the relationship among insurance regulators should be
inverted, so that different regulators are pitted against one
another in competition rather than joined together in cooperation.9 Two prominent reform proposals would implement such
regulatory competition by permitting individual insurers to select a single jurisdiction’s regulatory scheme, irrespective of
where that insurer sells coverage or conducts its operations. In
the first proposal, known as the Optional Federal Charter
(OFC), this choice would be binary: insurers would be permitted to opt-out of the current state-based regulatory regime in

8. See, e.g., Mark A. Hofmann, Trade Groups Applaud Fed Action on
AIG, BUS. INS., Sept. 17, 2008, available at http://www.businessinsurance.com/
article/20080917/NEWS/200013972 (reporting a statement from Marc Racicot,
president of the American Insurance Association, arguing that the AIG situation highlights the need for insurance regulatory reform); Tom Wilson, Op-Ed,
Regulate Me, Please, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009, at A29 (calling for federal
reform of regulation in light of AIG’s collapse). Additionally, congressional
committees have held numerous hearings in the last year on insurance regulatory reform in light of AIG’s collapse. See, e.g., Perspectives on Modernizing
Insurance Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009); The Causes and Effects of the AIG Bailout:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th
Cong. (2008).
9. In the last year, various commentators have advocated for enhanced
regulatory competition in insurance. See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4,
at 39–41; Grace & Scott, supra note 7, at 57; Mark E. Ruquet, Forbes Says Insurers Should Have Their Choice of Regulator, NAT’L UNDERWRITER, May 25,
2009, at 10, 10 (arguing that insurers and consumers should have the right to
choose who regulates them); Scott Harrington, Federal Chartering of Insurance Companies: Options and Alternatives for Transforming Insurance Regulation 22–23 (Networks Fin. Inst., Policy Brief No. 2006-PB-02, 2006), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=923605 (highlighting the
benefits of an optional federal charter); Sharon Tennyson, State Regulation and
Consumer Protection in the Insurance Industry 21 (Networks Fin. Inst., Policy
Brief No. 2008-PB-03, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=1106172 (arguing that regulatory competition—in the form
of the threat of federal preemption—“has spurred efficiency enhancing
changes in state market conduct regulation, as economic theory would predict”). Others have strongly resisted such regulatory competition. See Insurance Industry Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of J. Robert Hunter, Director of Insurance, Consumer Federation of America) (urging Congress to reject
the optional federal charter); Editorial, Regulator Shopping, N.Y. TIMES, May
21, 2009, at A34.
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favor of a newly created federal scheme.10 Fundamentally, this
proposal would replicate the dual banking system, which permits banks to acquire a charter at either the state or federal
level.11 The second proposal, dubbed the Single-License Solution (SLS), imagines more wide-ranging competition among different insurance regulators, whereby insurers would be empowered to select any state regulator to govern all of their
insurance operations across the country.12 It thus emulates the
system of corporate chartering, which permits corporations to
incorporate in any of the fifty states irrespective of their principal place of business.13
In one sense, this renewed enthusiasm for regulatory competition in insurance is ironic, as many blame similar forms of
regulatory competition for contributing to the global financial
panic of 2008.14 In the banking realm, for instance, allowing
banks to “shop” among competing regulators at the state and
federal level may have induced those regulators to consciously
ignore widespread predatory lending and overlook the immense
risks borne by individual banks.15 Similarly, regulatory competition in corporate law may arguably have contributed to the
executive compensation schemes that incentivized firms to fo10. See Grace & Scott, supra note 7, at 57; Harrington, supra note 9, at
22. See generally OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTERING AND REGULATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES, supra note 4 (outlining arguments for and against the
OFC).
11. See Robert Detlefsen, Dual Insurance Chartering: Potential Consequences, in THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 4, at 97, 98.
12. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 39–42 (enumerating the costs
and benefits of such a regulatory system); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, A Single-License Approach to Regulating Insurance 14 –15 (Nw. Univ.
Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 08-10; Univ. of Ill., Law & Econ.
Research Paper No. LE08-015, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1134792 [hereinafter Butler & Ribstein, Regulating Insurance]; Harrington,
supra note 9, at 28–29.
13. See Harrington, supra note 9, at 28–29 (explaining that this approach
“has its roots in corporate law, where corporations choose a state in which to
be chartered”).
14. See Regulator Shopping, supra note 9.
15. See, e.g., Consumer Protections in Financial Services: Past Problems,
Future Solutions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 62–63 (2009) (prepared statement of Patricia A.
McCoy, Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law). But see Todd J.
Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime Lending,
80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 12 (2009) (arguing that regulations should not “unduly
disrupt the market for legitimate subprime loans” because “only a minority of
subprime loans could be considered ‘predatory’”).
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cus too much on short-term profits and too little on long-term
risks.16
At the same time, regulatory competition can indeed generate substantial benefits depending on the context in which it
is deployed and the way in which it is structured.17 In certain
situations, regulatory competition may provide an appropriate
“safety valve” against excessive regulation, motivate regulators
to design efficient and responsive regimes, and provide regulation that matches the legitimate needs of different types of regulated entities.18 Indeed, many (if not most) corporate law scholars endorse jurisdictional competition, and the dual chartering
system in banking is so revered that none of the serious proposals to modernize banking regulation would upset it.19
As such, this Article explores the case for promoting competition among regulators of life, property, and casualty insurance markets.20 It focuses on the key argument for promoting
16. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 184 –85 (2004) (arguing that executives with options are incentivized to drive up short-term
share value at the expense of long-term value); Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell,
Avoiding “Short-Term Capital Management”: Can Better Corporate Governance Prevent Future Crises? (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
Of course, this point is quite speculative, and others resist both the notion that
executive pay is primarily responsible for creating excessive risk taking and
the notion that it is excessive from the standpoint of shareholder value. See
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1615, 1629–30 (2005) (book review) (criticizing Pay Without Performance,
noting that strong evidence suggests that executive compensation packages
are designed to align managerial and shareholder interests); John E. Core et
al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103
MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1172–77 (2005) (reviewing BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra); cf.
Nathan Knutt, Executive Compensation Regulation: Corporate America, Heal
Thyself, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 493, 495, 500–06 (2005) (arguing that government
regulation of executive compensation is generally ineffective and that companies should self-regulate in this area).
17. See generally Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Introduction, in
REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES, at xix, xxiii–xxxi (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001)
(introducing the concept of regulatory competition and outlining various costs
and benefits).
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part I.B.
20. See generally M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives are Not “Insurance” (Univ. of Chicago John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper, Paper No.
476, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1440945 (arguing that credit derivatives are not insurance and should not be
governed as insurance). With respect to health insurance, regulatory reform is
currently proceeding independently of other forms of insurance reform, in
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regulatory competition: that it can improve the substance of insurance regulation by harnessing the power of markets.21 This
Article concludes that regulatory competition cannot be defended on this basis in the context of property, casualty, and
life insurance markets. Rather than promote optimal regulation, regulatory competition would inevitably tend to promote
deregulation irrespective of its desirability.22 Ultimately, such
deregulation would prove undesirable, even in the small doses
that might be induced by limited regulatory competition such
as that imagined in the OFC. It would tend to exacerbate existing problems with the political economy of insurance regulation
and impede the development of effective regulatory innovation.23
By focusing on regulatory competition’s impact on the substance of insurance regulation, this Article deliberately sidesteps several important issues that are relevant to any discussion of reforming insurance regulation.24 First, and most
importantly, it does not address the fact that both the SLS and
OFC proposals would eliminate the need for multistate insurers to comply with multiple regulatory regimes.25 Although this
large part because health insurance is fundamentally intertwined with health
care in the United States, and health care is a central policy issue.
21. See ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 16, 26
(2009).
22. But see id. (arguing that regulatory competition is desirable because it
promotes optimal outcomes, irrespective of whether efficiency requires more or
less regulation).
23. Others have also suggested that regulatory competition might promote a race to the bottom in insurance, though they have not analyzed this
prospect extensively. See Lissa Lamkin Broome, A Federal Charter Option for
Insurance Companies: Lessons from the Bank Experience, in FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION AFTER GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY 203, 219–23 (Patricia A. McCoy ed.,
2002) (highlighting the risk that an OFC might promote a race to the bottom
by analogizing the OFC to the banking industry); Elizabeth F. Brown, The
Fatal Flaw of Proposals to Federalize Insurance 39 (Univ. of St. Thomas Sch.
of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 07-25, 2007), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1008993 (mentioning that regulatory competition in insurance might promote a race to the bottom).
24. This Article also avoids questions concerning whether regulatory competition would hamper effective enforcement by geographically separating policyholders from their regulators. See, e.g., THERESE M. VAUGHAN, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NAT’L ASS’N. OF INS. COMM’RS, PERSPECTIVES ON SYSTEMIC
RISK 9–12 (Mar. 5, 2009); Tennyson, supra note 9, at 12–13, 21 (focusing on
the impact that regulatory competition via an OFC might have on various enforcement issues, such as the effectiveness of consumer complaint handling
and market conduct exams).
25. See Grace & Klein, supra note 5, at 111 (“Insurers under a federal
charter would need to prepare reports for and respond to inquiries from only
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may be a desirable outcome, various regulatory reforms—
including modified versions of the OFC and SLS—could accomplish this goal without promoting regulatory competition.26 To
be sure, each of these alternatives would themselves be imperfect.27 But the goal of this Article is not to definitively establish
the pros and cons of all reform proposals. Rather, it is to demonstrate, in the insurance context, that a reform proposal’s embrace of regulatory competition ought to count as a substantial
negative in evaluating it. For similar reasons, the Article does
not address the impact of enhanced regulatory competition on
American insurance regulators’ coordination with international
regulatory authorities.28
Despite these omissions, the Article’s conclusion that regulatory competition would degrade the content of insurance regulation has important policy implications. First, it largely undermines the case for the SLS proposal, which is premised on
the notion that regulatory competition would promote optimal
insurance regulation.29 Second, this Article raises substantial—
though not definitive—concerns about OFC proposals. It also
specifically rejects the claims of some that the OFC’s limited

one regulator, rather than multiple regulators.”); Klein, Overview, supra note
5, at 40–42.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 39–41 (discussing various proposals
that would reduce duplicative compliance costs without promoting regulatory
competition); see also text accompanying notes 356–357 (noting that regulatory competition is not necessary to reduce compliance costs).
27. See generally NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (emphasizing
the importance of comparative institutional analysis, given the fact that all
institutions are imperfect but nonetheless enjoy comparative benefits over
other institutions).
28. See generally Brown, supra note 3, at 972, 987–88 (discussing such
impacts). In any event, it is likely that enhanced regulatory competition would
exacerbate the difficulty of American insurance regulators’ coordination with
international authorities by eliminating the capacity of any one body or constituency to represent American insurance regulators’ interests on the world
stage.
29. Butler and Ribstein contend that “[t]he major problem with the current system of insurance regulation that needs to be fixed is that it turns what
could be the big advantage for the United States in the global marketplace—
the ‘genius’ of our federal system—into a significant disadvantage, where domestic firms are crippled by multiple state regulation and foreign firms are
deterred from entering.” Butler & Ribstein, Regulating Insurance, supra note
12, at 9; see also Ruquet, supra note 9, at 10 (arguing that insurers should
have the right to choose who regulates them).
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form of regulatory competition would promote improved insurance regulation.30
This Article develops a three-part framework for analyzing
the impact of regulatory competition on the content of regulation. First, it examines the demand side of regulatory markets,
focusing on how insurers—the “buyers” in regulatory markets—would select among competing regulators—the “sellers”
in these markets. Second, it assesses the supply side of regulatory markets, or how competing regulators would respond to
insurers’ demand for regulation. Finally, it looks at the extent
to which regulatory competition schemes can employ minimum
standards, judicial oversight, risk-based insurance requirements, and other design elements that regulate the regulatory
market, producing controlled competition among different regulators. Part I further explains this three-part analytical framework and provides an overview of the current OFC and SLS
proposals that promote regulatory competition.
Part II examines the first element of this tripartite framework—the demand side of regulatory markets—and analyzes
how individual insurers would choose among multiple regulators were they empowered to do so. It concludes that insurers
offering consumer-oriented coverage would inevitably “demand”
deregulation, irrespective of the social desirability of this outcome. Market forces would exert only minimal discipline on insurers’ regulatory choices, and the legitimate interests of third
parties would be entirely excluded from insurers’ calculus. In
fact, insurers’ regulatory demand might actually harm the collective interests of insurers themselves; regulatory choice could
destabilize the capacity of regulation to solve prisoner’s dilemma problems by allowing individual insurers to “cheat” from
the collective optimum. And the prospect that a competing reg30. Scott Harrington has argued that “optional federal chartering could
promote beneficial regulatory competition,” because it could “discipline the potential excesses of either state or federal regulators.” Harrington, supra note
9, at 22. Martin Grace and Hal Scott have also claimed that the OFC might be
beneficial because “efficiency in the provision of public goods can also be enhanced competition among government agencies for their provision, since government regulators can be monopolists and suffer from principal-asset problems of their own.” Grace & Scott, supra note 7, at 57; see also GRACE &
KLEIN, infra note 139, at 3 (“Some have expressed concerns that an OFC
would lead to competition between federal and state regulators that would ultimately degrade rather than improve insurance regulation. However, we argue that if good regulation benefits consumers and they value these benefits,
then insurers will be motivated to seek optimal regulatory jurisdictions that
would increase rather than diminish firm value.”).
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ulator might offer particularly attractive direct services to insurers—such as policy design, data aggregation, or fraud detection—would be unlikely to alter this result given the entrenched role of industry associations in supplying such
services to insurers.
Part III analyzes regulatory supply, including the extent to
which regulatory demand would improve the political economy
of state insurance regulation. It argues that the deregulatory
forces that regulatory competition would produce are not normatively desirable. Insurance regulation is structurally more
susceptible to underregulation than overregulation, particularly outside of the solvency domain. Although solvency regulation
can be criticized on efficiency grounds, Part III argues that
regulatory competition is not the answer. Rather, regulatory
competition would actually undermine solvency modernization
because it is largely incompatible with effective principles-based
regulation. Finally, it contends that regulatory competition
would not improve regulatory specialization relative to the status quo.
Part IV applies the third part of the analytical framework,
evaluating the extent to which effective institutional design
could harness the benefits of regulatory competition while limiting its costs. It argues that such regulation of regulatory
markets would likely be only partially effective. With respect to
market conduct regulation and other forms of nonsolvency regulation, it suggests that minimum standards intended to limit
the risk of excessive deregulation would be difficult to enforce.
Similarly, allowing individual states to opt-out of a regulatory
competition scheme in order to preserve consumer protections
would provide only a limited check on these risks. Designing
regulatory competition to promote effective solvency regulation
is also a challenge, as neither guarantee funds nor marketoriented approaches are likely to prove effective in an OFC or
SLS scheme.
This Article concludes by acknowledging the potential need
to reform insurance regulation. But rather than embracing
regulatory competition, this Article concludes that effective
reform should strive to avoid it. Numerous potential reforms do
just that, such as proposals to create a single federal insurance
regulator, empower a federal agency to coordinate state regulation, or create a federal regulator for all multistate insurers. To
be sure, each of these options has its own distinctive flaws. It is
for this reason that the Article leaves open the possibility that
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proposals which mildly increase regulatory competition—such
as an OFC option with mandatory consumer safeguards—may
ultimately be the least-worst reform options. But before so concluding, policymakers should more carefully scrutinize proposals that avoid enhancing regulatory competition, rather than
reflexively importing the regulatory architecture of banking
and corporate law into the insurance sphere.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF REGULATORY COMPETITION
In its broadest sense, regulatory competition has two basic
ingredients. First, business entities or individuals must have
some degree of choice among at least two regulatory systems.
In some cases, exercising that choice may be quite costly, requiring, for instance, physically locating oneself in a jurisdiction with the desired regulatory scheme or selling products exclusively within that jurisdiction. In other cases, the targets of
regulation may be able to exercise regulatory choice much more
easily, simply by filing documents with a particular jurisdiction
or writing contracts that reference that jurisdiction.31 The
second necessary component of regulatory competition is that
individual jurisdictions must have some incentive to attract regulated parties to their regime.32 These incentives can include
increasing tax revenues, promoting economic growth, or simply
expanding regulatory influence.33
Section A of this Part provides a brief overview of the regulatory reform debate in insurance and its linkage to regulatory
competition. It focuses on the two proposals that would enhance regulatory competition in insurance by empowering insurers to select among competing regulators without changing
their base of operations or the location of their insurance sales.
Section B then examines three key issues that frame the debate
in the extant literature about the ways in which regulatory
31. See Harrington, supra note 9, at 28–29.
32. See Esty & Geradin, supra note 17, at xxiii.
33. This conception of regulatory competition mirrors that given in Esty &
Geradin, supra note 17, at xxiii–xxiv. Note that this definition of regulatory
competition does not consider preemption threats from the federal government. Such threats may substantially impact regulatory evolution. See Mark
J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 601–07 (2003) (noting
that federal law often limits, or threatens to limit, states’ authority to regulate
internal affairs). However, they can be distinguished from regulatory competition because the federal government can unilaterally preempt state law in the
insurance realm. But see Tennyson, supra note 9, at 21 (characterizing the
threat of federal preemption in insurance as regulatory competition).
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competition impacts the substance of regulation. These three
issues organize the remainder of the Article.
A. REGULATORY COMPETITION AND INSURANCE REFORM
The current scheme of American insurance regulation entrusts individual states and territories to regulate insurance
transactions that occur within their boundaries.34 As with virtually any regulatory scheme, it creates some degree of regulatory competition.35 In most cases, insurers that disfavor a particular jurisdiction’s regulatory regime can shift their sales
elsewhere to avoid this regulation.36 But this mechanism for
exercising regulatory choice is costly, as profits can generally
be made by selling coverage even in jurisdictions with regulatory regimes that insurers perceive to be excessive.37 For this
reason, insurers almost never exercise this form of regulatory
choice, and their occasional threats to do so are rarely credible.38
34. See Randall, supra note 1, at 629. See generally Macey & Miller, supra
note 1, at 20–26.
35. Indeed, regulatory competition is an important topic in fields ranging
from tax, labor, and financial services law to environmental regulation. See
generally Esty & Geradin, supra note 17, at ixx–xxxi (discussing the evolution
of regulatory competition theory in different substantive literatures).
36. Interestingly, regulators often attempt to prevent insurers from exiting a state. This practice is both controversial and only partially effective. See
generally Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights and Insurance Regulation: From Federalism to Takings, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 293, 300–08 (1999) (describing insurers’ exit rights and how states limit these rights).
37. One exception to this point involves captive insurance companies,
which effectively only sell insurance to one company and generally need only
become licensed in one state to reach a market of purchasers in other states.
See infra notes 288–89 and accompanying text.
38. See KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION:
THE CASE OF INSURANCE 53 (1998). See generally Bruce G. Carruthers &
Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Regulatory Races: The Effects of Jurisdictional Competition on Regulatory Standards (UCLA Ctr. for Econ. History Working Paper,
2009), available at http://www.econ.ucla.edu/people/papers/Lamoreaux/Lamoreaux
484.pdf (arguing that firms across regulatory contexts rarely exit for regulatory reasons when doing so requires physically relocating or substantially altering their sales practices). The biggest exception to this point is that many
property insurers have recently left Florida, thus their threats to leave were
certainly credible. See Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein, The Perfect Storm:
Hurricanes, Insurance, and Regulation, 12 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 81, 85–86
(2009); see also infra note 228 and accompanying text. Florida is distinctive,
though, as there are obviously nonregulatory factors, like hurricanes, which
make it more risky to provide insurance in the state. See Grace & Klein, supra, at 81–82. There has also been some evidence of increased movement of
insurers to states that have relaxed certain elements of their insurance regu-
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Although regulating insurers where they sell coverage produces minimal regulatory competition, it generates a host of
problems. Foremost among these is that state regulation
creates some degree of duplicative compliance costs and inconsistencies for insurers that sell coverage in more than one
state.39 Indeed, multistate insurers must design different products to conform with different states’ regulatory standards, acquire licenses from multiple states, and employ differing underwriting models in different states.40 Although these
duplicative costs have decreased substantially in the last decade due to state coordination via the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), many assert that there is a
natural limit to the effectiveness of these efforts.41

lation. See DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE: RESTORING COMPETITION AND INCREASING MARKET EFFICIENCY 131, 256–58 (J. David Cummins ed., 2002) (analyzing automobile insurance rates in Illinois, the only
state operating without rate regulatory law).
39. See Grace & Scott, supra note 7, at 58.
40. See SHEILA BLAIR, UNIV. OF MASS. ISENBERG SCH. OF MGMT., CONSUMER RAMIFICATIONS OF AN OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTER FOR LIFE INSURERS 32–37 (2004) (attempting to quantify the costs of duplicative regulation in
the life insurance industry); Klein, Overview, supra note 5, at 40–41. Insurers
often complain that market conduct exams by different states are duplicative.
See Robert W. Klein & James W. Schacht, An Assessment of Insurance Market
Conduct Surveillances, 20 J. INS. REG. 51, 79 (2001). Others, however, suggest
that insurance market conduct exams are extraordinarily uncommon in most
states. See JEFFREY STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD: THE STORY OF CAMPBELL V.
STATE FARM INSURANCE (2008).
41. Among other activities, the NAIC drafts model laws, collects and aggregates state-level data, helps administer solvency regulation by an insurer’s
state of domicile, and helps coordinate market conduct regulation to reduce
duplicative compliance costs. See Randall, supra note 1, at 636–38, 640–41.
The NAIC has also facilitated the development of an interstate compact to
provide coordinated review and approval of life insurers’ product filings. See
Interstate Insurance Product Regulation Commission, History, http://www
.insurancecompact.org/history.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). Nonetheless,
many view these approaches as skirting the fundamental problem that insurance is an interstate, and increasingly an international, business. See Klein,
Overview, supra note 5, at 42 (arguing that states have “embark[ed] on ambitious policy and institutional reforms” designed to “streamline, harmonize,
and rationalize the current system of state regulation,” but noting that “there
is a limit to how far harmonization can go”); Martin Grace, A Reexamination of
Federal Regulation in the Insurance Industry 21 (Networks Fin. Inst., Policy
Brief No. 2009-PB-02, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=1350538. For more on this issue, see infra notes 313–16 and
accompanying text (describing coordination efforts by the NAIC and contrasting this with the lack of coordination that would result from a single state opting to impose its own set of insurance laws and regulations).
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Numerous proposals have been advanced in the last several decades to address these claimed costs of the state-based insurance scheme. For instance, the State Modernization and
Regulatory Transparency Act (SMART Act) would have created
a federal agency to help coordinate state insurance regulation
and expanded the influence of the NAIC.42 A recent working
paper by state insurance regulators proposes a similar role for
the federal government in facilitating uniformity among state
regulators without preempting state regulation.43 The Insurance Company Protection Act of 2003 would have required all
multistate insurers to be chartered at the federal level, but left
single-state insurers to be chartered at the state level.44 And, of
course, some proposals would scrap the state-based system of
insurance regulation entirely and replace it with a single federal regulatory scheme.45
Other proposed reforms attempt to address the duplicative
and overlapping nature of state insurance regulation by allowing insurers to choose a single regulator irrespective of the location of their insurance sales.46 By permitting insurers to
choose a single regulator, this strategy obviously limits the extent to which multistate insurers will be subject to duplicative
and overlapping regulatory schemes.47 At the same time,
though, these types of reform fundamentally alter the degree of
regulatory competition in insurance regulation. Unlike the status quo, they allow insurers to exercise regulatory choice without incurring any meaningful cost as a result. As evidenced by
similar forms of regulatory competition in the financial services

42. See Brown, supra note 23, at 32–34; Klein, Overview, supra note 5, at
44 –45.
43. See NAT’L INS. SUPERVISORY COMM’N, REGULATORY MODERNIZATION:
DISCUSSION DRAFT FOR STAKEHOLDER DIALOGUE 1 (2009), available at http://
www.naic.org/documents/committees_ex_rmsg_nisc_discussion_draft.pdf (describing the basic elements of the proposal).
44. See Brown, supra note 23, at 37–38. A similar proposal, advanced by
Robert Cooper, envisions that “the federal government would be the rulemaker, and the state insurance commissioners would enforce those rules within their states.” Robert W. Cooper, OFC: Is it Really Overkill?, 26 J. INS. REG.
5, 9 (2008). Unfortunately, this proposal is clearly unconstitutional under Supreme Court case law preventing the federal government from commandeering state governments. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
45. See, e.g., Klein, Overview, supra note 5, at 49; Brown, supra note 23,
at 63–75 (outlining various federal regulatory schemes).
46. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 39–42.
47. See id. at 38–39.
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and corporate law spheres, this dramatically increases the degree of competition among regulators.48
Two reforms of this variety have received particular attention in recent months. The first, dubbed the Single-License Solution (SLS), would mimic the structure of jurisdictional competition in corporate law.49 Corporations have long been
permitted to incorporate, or reincorporate, in any state, and individual states receive various potential benefits from attracting incorporations, including increased tax revenue.50 The SLS
would similarly permit insurers to select a single state insurance regulator to govern all of their insurance operations and
allow states to tax the sales of the insurers they regulate.51 In
addition to allowing insurers to select their regulator of choice,
the SLS proposal would permit insurers to choose the law governing disputes with policyholders.52
The proponents of the SLS recognize the possibility that it
could produce a race to the bottom, and they propose several
safeguards to limit that risk.53 First, the SLS would permit
state legislatures to opt-out and impose their own consumer
protection regulations and laws, so long as the legislative optout only applied prospectively and insurers maintained a clear
right to exit the state.54 Second, the proposal would potentially
require all insurers to issue “solvency bonds.”55 Investors who
purchased an insurer’s solvency bond would receive a marketdetermined yield on their investment if the guarantee fund of
48. See O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 21, at 28; Carruthers & Lamoreaux, supra note 38, at 2 (noting that firms regularly exercise choice among
competing regulatory schemes when doing so simply requires changing their
corporate identity or source of capital).
49. Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 39; see also Butler & Ribstein, Regulating Insurance, supra note 12, at 14 –15 (calling the SLS an “analogous
proposal for insurance regulation”); Harrington, supra note 9, at 28.
50. See generally ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 6–48 (1993). Delaware generally dominates this regulatory competition, with most corporations choosing to incorporate either in the state of their
principal place of business or in Delaware. See id. at 6; Roe, supra note 33, at
594 –96.
51. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 39–40.
52. See id. at 40 (explaining that such a choice would ultimately lower
prices by ensuring certainty).
53. These safeguards are individually addressed infra Part IV.
54. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 40. This requirement is important given the historical tendency of states to refuse to allow insurers to withdraw. See Epstein, supra note 36, at 300. For more on this issue, see infra Part
IV.A.2.
55. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 40.
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the insurer’s chosen regulator did not default in the contractually specified time period.56 By contrast, if the guarantee
fund of the insurer’s chosen regulator did default, then the purchasers of the bond would lose their investment, which would
presumably be used to make up for the state guarantee fund’s
default.57 The central idea behind requiring the purchase of
these bonds is that their yield will reflect the strength of a
state’s solvency regulation—and thus the likelihood that its
guarantee fund will fail—thereby causing firms to avoid states
with excessively lax solvency regulation.58
A second prominent reform proposal, known as the Optional Federal Charter (OFC), would introduce a more limited form
of regulatory competition into insurance regulation.59 The OFC
proposal is modeled on the dual banking system, which allows
banks to acquire a charter at either the state or federal level.60
Banks that opt for a state charter must select the state in
which they have their principal place of business.61 The OFC
would similarly give insurers the option of opting out of the
current system of state insurance regulation, in favor of a single federal regulator.62 As in the banking system, insurers
56. Id.
57. See id. For further explanation of how these bonds would work and
discussion of potential problems, see infra Part IV.B.2.
58. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 40.
59. See Harrington, supra note 9, at 22.
60. See Detlefsen, supra note 11, at 98.
61. See JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 95
(3d ed. 2001); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53
BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1987). Banks that charter at the federal level have some degree of choice among multiple regulatory bodies, including the Office of
Comptroller of Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Federal Reserve. Although current reform proposals could alter the extent of regulatory
competition among federal banking regulators, they all leave intact the dual
system of banking regulation. See Helene Cooper, Obama Pushes Financial
Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2009, at A20; Damian Paletta, Historic Overhaul of Finance Rules, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2009, at A1; Brian Wingfield,
Bank Regulation Blowout, NEWSWEEK, June 17, 2009, available at http://www
.newsweek.com/id/202379.
62. See Detlefsen, supra note 11, at 98. See generally Grace & Scott, supra
note 7, at 55–91 (explaining how an OFC would function). Under most proposals, the federal insurance regulator would be housed within the Department of
the Treasury. See Broome, supra note 23, at 206. Recent OFC proposals were
introduced in the House in April of 2009 by Representatives Melissa Bean and
Ed Royce, and in the Senate in May of 2007 by Senators John Sununu and
Tim Johnson. See Grace, supra note 41, at 4 –7. Grace criticizes these recent
OFC proposals for “merely copy[ing] the structure of the banking system.” Id.
at 8.
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would be free to switch back and forth between the state and
federal regulator.63 Various versions of OFC proposals exist,
but most do not explicitly permit insurers to include in their
policies choice-of-law provisions specifying the state law governing the resolution of insurer-policyholder disputes.64
The degree of regulatory competition that the OFC would
actually generate is sometimes contested. The OFC would
clearly create less regulatory competition than the SLS, as it
envisions two competing regulatory systems rather than fifty.
But several commentators have suggested that even this choice
would be illusory, leading to a “one-way street” where large national insurers would inevitably choose to charter federally in
order to avoid the duplicative nature of the state regulatory regime.65
While it is possible that a national insurance regulator
might, in fact, have a comparative advantage over state regulators in attracting large insurers, the OFC would nonetheless
create some nontrivial degree of regulatory competition. First,
small and medium-sized insurers that only operated in a few
states would not necessarily favor a federal regulator over a
state regulator, especially given the potential costs associated
with switching. Second, the costs to insurers of complying with
multiple state regulators have decreased substantially in recent years.66 As a result, the potential benefits that insurers
would enjoy from dealing with a single regulator are more likely to be outweighed by the prospect of less stringent regulation
imposed by multiple state regulators. Finally, both state and
federal regulators would have strong incentives to attract insurers to their system under most OFC proposals. For states,
those incentives would include their receipt of regulatory fees
and avoiding the de facto nationalization of insurance regulation.67 The incentives of a federal insurance regulator to attract
63. See Detlefsen, supra note 11, at 98.
64. For example, a 2009 bill proposing an OFC does not give insurers unfettered choice. See National Insurance Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 1880,
111th Cong. § 312 (2009) (allowing the insurer to choose its principle place of
business, main office, or location of its policyholder as its jurisdiction).
65. See Broome, supra note 23, at 220; Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at
38 (stating that OFC would merely provide “the mirage of competition”).
66. See infra text accompanying note 315.
67. Although most OFC proposals permit states to continue to tax insurers that opt for a federal charter, “the removal of a significant portion of the
industry from state oversight could substantially reduce other state-imposed
regulatory fees, which have served as a major source of funding for state insurance departments.” Klein, Overview, supra note 5, at 46.
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insurers are dependent on the details of different OFC proposals.68 But most OFC proposals envision that fees imposed on
regulated entities would fund the federal insurance regulator,
and an insurer’s choice to charter federally could also impact
the scope of the federal regulators’ power and authority.69
There is substantial evidence that similar fee structures for the
Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) and Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) give them a strong incentive to attract and
retain regulated banks.70
B. THE DESIRABILITY OF REGULATORY COMPETITION
Although the desirability of regulatory competition has received only minimal sustained scholarly attention in insurance,71 it has been analyzed exhaustively in corporate law, securities law, and banking law. This section distills a
substantial portion of this literature by describing three major
issues that determine the impact of enhanced regulatory competition on the substance of regulation. It first isolates arguments concerning regulatory demand, or the process by which
regulated entities select their regulators within a scheme of
regulatory competition. Second, it describes arguments regarding regulatory supply, or the likely responses of regulators to
regulatory demand. Third, it reviews several potential mechanisms for “regulating” the process of regulatory competition in
order to prevent a race to the bottom. The remainder of this Article applies this framework to the regulation of insurance, analyzing regulatory demand in Part II, regulatory supply in Part
III, and the regulation of regulatory markets in Part IV.
1. Regulatory Demand
Not surprisingly, the effects of regulatory competition on
substantive law are inextricably linked to the way that regulated entities choose among competing regulators. Thus, one of
the most common defenses of regulatory choice is that the interests of regulated entities in selecting among competing regu68. See infra Part IV.
69. See Grace & Scott, supra note 7, at 78–79. The scope of the federal
regulators’ authority might be particularly important to a new federal insurance regulator interested in establishing its authority and stature.
70. See, e.g., Dain C. Donelson & David Zaring, Charter Switching and the
Financial Crisis: Evidence from the Office of Thrift Supervision 6–8 (Ill. Corp.
Law Colloquium Working Paper 2009).
71. See supra notes 12–13.
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lators match the interests of the intended beneficiaries of regulation. This argument is particularly important in corporate
law, which regulates the internal affairs of corporations and is
principally intended to benefit shareholders. Proponents of
state chartering argue that managers will incorporate in the
state that best promotes the interests of shareholders.72 Although shareholders cannot easily observe managers’ everyday
decisions, they can monitor and react to managers’ selection of
a regulatory regime.73 The efficiency of capital markets consequently means that the price of the corporation’s shares will accurately reflect this choice.74 Because managers seek to maximize the price of corporate stock—doing so results in higher pay,
greater job security, more valuable stock options, and enhanced
reputation—they will select an optimal regulatory regime for
shareholders.75 This, in turn, motivates jurisdictions to compete
in generating efficient corporate law.76
By contrast, detractors of regulatory competition in corporate law generally dispute the claim that the sole driving force
behind managerial decisionmaking is increasing stock prices.77
Although increases in stock price will generally improve managers’ job security and compensation, occasionally choices that
decrease share price may best serve managers’ personal interests. In particular, corporate laws that directly enhance man72. Ralph K. Winter Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 276 (1977); see also FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 6–7 (1991); ROMANO, supra note 50, at 15; Robert M. Daines, Does
Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 525 (2001) (arguing
that empirical evidence favors a race to the top, as Delaware firms are worth
more than similar firms incorporated in other jurisdictions).
73. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 72, at 1–3 (describing the
agency problem of corporate law and how various different mechanisms of corporate law help to address these agency problems).
74. See id. at 17–21; Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2366–67 (1998); Winter, supra note 72, at 275–76.
75. See Winter, supra note 72, at 266.
76. See Romano, supra note 74, at 2366–67; Winter, supra note 72, at
275–76. As in all markets, the pace of evolution towards this efficient market
outcome may be slow, and punctuated by wrong turns. See EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 72, at 220–22; Michael Abramowicz, Speeding Up the
Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 168–70 (2003).
77. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1435, 1445 (1992); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974); Melvin Avon Eisenberg,
The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1510 (1989).
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agers’ job security and compensation—such as barriers to hostile takeovers—may more than offset the indirect impact of decreased share price on job security and compensation.78 At least
with respect to these issues, critics of jurisdictional competition
argue that the status quo system has promoted a “race to the
bottom” in corporate law.79
The corporate law scheme of regulatory competition has
prompted reform proposals in a number of other fields, including securities law, where some have argued that issuers ought
to be allowed to opt-out of the federal regime and choose a single state that would govern their securities transactions.80 As
in corporate law, defenders of regulatory competition argue
that issuers would select a disclosure regime that best met the
interests of investors because doing so would maximize the
price of their securities.81 Similarly, critics of such regulatory
choice in securities law argue that the interests of issuers are
not, in fact, aligned with regulatory objectives, which include
social benefits that go beyond the interests of individual investors.82
78. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Takeover
Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note
17, at 68, 73–74; Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1800 (2002); Eisenberg, supra
note 77, at 1510.
79. See Bebchuk, supra note 77, at 1444 –45, 1458–68 (arguing that jurisdictional competition may benefit certain elements of corporate law, even
while it promotes a race to the bottom elsewhere, where the interests of managers and shareholders are not aligned).
80. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV.
903, 947–48 (1998); see also Stephen J. Choi, Law, Finance, and Path Dependence: Developing Strong Securities Markets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1657, 1702
(2002); Romano, supra note 74, at 2367–68, 2383–88 (arguing that jurisdictional competition should govern the registration of securities and continuous
disclosure requirements). Others have advocated for extending such regulatory competition to the regulation of securities exchanges as well. See Jonathan
R. Macey, Regulatory Competition in the US Federal System: Banking and Financial Services, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES supra note 17, at 95, 105–09.
81. See, e.g., Choi, supra note 80, 1704 –05; Rafael La Porta et al., What
Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1, 23–25 (2006) (concluding that issuers
tend to raise capital in countries where there are strong disclosure regimes,
suggesting that it is in the interest of issuers to find strong regulation); Macey,
supra note 80, at 106; Romano, supra note 74, at 2414.
82. See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why
Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1342–69
(1999).
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Unlike in corporate and securities law, the banking law literature does not generally defend regulatory competition based
primarily on claims that banks would demand efficient regulation.83 In part, this is because a core goal of banking law is to
promote the safety and soundness of banks.84 As such, its principal purpose is to limit the externalities associated with failed
banks, including systemic risk.85 There is little reason to expect
that banks would fully consider this risk in selecting a regulator, as these costs (by definition) fall on unrelated third parties.86
Perhaps even more importantly, banking law is partially
designed to protect ordinary consumers. By contrast, regulatory
competition in corporate law applies only to the internal affairs
of corporations and does not extend to the regulation of corporate behavior in the consumer markets where they sell their
products.87 Many banking law scholars have argued that banks
offering consumer services—particularly credit cards—
generally exploit regulatory competition to select regimes that
harm their customers. Regulatory competition in this domain
expands beyond the dual federal/state choice normally associated with banking regulation, as the state in which a national
bank is located has historically determined many of the consumer protection laws applicable to that bank’s operations.88 As
83. But cf. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers,
the Federal Response, and the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System,
58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1250 (1990) (“As in the case of corporate chartering, investor discipline could play a substantial role in restraining state competition in bank chartering, provided that state banks are required to maintain substantial amounts of equity capital.”).
84. Kathleen J. Woody, The International Economic Implications of Deregulating the U.S. Banking Industry, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 25, 77 (1981).
85. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 61, at 251.
86. See O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 21, at 33. Consistent with this
reasoning, recent evidence suggests that bank charter switching may have
promoted deregulation, which helped cause the recent financial crisis. See Donelson & Zaring, supra note 70, at 18–19. The role of externalities is also important in the securities and corporate law contexts. Much of the debate about
regulatory competition in securities law turns on the potential third-party effects of securities regulation. Compare Fox, supra note 82, at 1342–63, with
Romano, supra note 74, at 2380–81. In corporate law, proponents of jurisdictional competition generally dismiss the claim that corporate law should promote the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein,
Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1431, 1445 (2006).
87. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 72.
88. See Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv.
Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 310 (1978) (holding that usury laws applicable to a na-
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a result, national banks have been free to “export” the consumer protection laws of the state in which they are located to consumers across the country.89 It is abundantly clear that this
exportation doctrine has resulted in national banks choosing to
locate in states that pursue deregulation (particularly South
Dakota).90 And most commentators argue that, in doing so, national banks purposely exploit their least-informed consumers.91 Others, however, suggest that banks have selected deregulatory regimes precisely because doing so advances the
rational self-interest of their customers.92
2. Regulatory Supply
Firms operating in a scheme of regulatory competition may
select regulators that minimize costs and regulatory constraints, irrespective of whether they protect the interests of
the intended beneficiaries of regulation. But the mere fact that
regulated entities would demand an inefficiently minimalist
regulatory regime does not necessarily mean that competing
regulators would supply such a regime. Competing regulators
are usually responsive to considerations other than attracting
regulated entities. These considerations are numerous, and include faithfully pursuing regulatory objectives, currying favor
from political groups, avoiding negative media scrutiny, generating fundraising sources, and expanding regulatory power and
tional bank’s operations are determined by the state in which that bank is located). Subsequent cases expanded this doctrine to encompass various other
consumer protection laws in the credit context. See Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The
Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 520–22 (2004). Recent federal reforms of the laws governing credit cards substantially reduce the capacity of a jurisdiction to export lax laws to other states. See generally Credit
Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, 123
Stat. 1734 (2009).
89. See Schiltz, supra note 88, at 520–22.
90. Id. at 552 (noting South Dakota and Delaware in particular).
91. See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 86–95 (2008); Prentiss Cox, The Importance of Deceptive
Practice Enforcement in Financial Institution Regulation, 30 PACE L. REV. 279,
297 (2009); Adam J. Levitan, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, YALE J. ON REG. 143, 159 (2009); Art E. Wilmarth Jr., The
Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of
the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 1002–25 (2009).
92. See generally Todd J. Zwycki, Economics of Credit Cards (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 00-22, 2000), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=229356 (arguing that Marquette’s
holding, which acquiesced to the selection of deregulated regimes, inevitably
led to a “market more responsive to consumer demand”).
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prestige.93 Many of these considerations will often weigh
against simply dismantling regulatory restrictions in response
to regulatory demand.94
Firms’ demand for laxity in a scheme of regulatory competition is particularly unlikely to dominate other regulatory inputs to the extent that regulatory choice is limited to only a few
competing regulators, as in the case of the dual banking system
or OFC proposals.95 As the number of competing regulators decreases, the importance of regulatory demand, as compared to
more traditional inputs into regulators’ decision-making calculus, decreases as well. This is no different than ordinary markets, where decreased competition is often thought to decrease
firms’ incentives to respond to consumer preferences.96
To the extent that regulatory demand simply supplements,
but does not overwhelm, other factors that impact regulators’
decisions, it may ultimately improve the political economy of
regulation. This is because competing regulators may improve
efficiency without sacrificing effectiveness in their efforts to
balance wooing regulated entities with their competing regulatory interests. For instance, they may eliminate ineffective regulatory hurdles, develop innovative but effective new rules, or
develop specialized expertise.97
Scholars often employ these arguments to defend the dual
banking system. First, proponents of dual banking often claim
that bank regulators are prone to excessive regulation due to
93. See, e.g., MEIER, supra note 38, at 167 (describing the complex and
multifaceted nature of political economy of regulation).
94. See Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 335 (1987); Wilmarth, supra note 83, at
1242 (“[T]he ‘competition in laxity’ argument overlooks the strong incentive of
both elected public officials and appointed bank regulators to avoid bank failures.”). The risk that excessively lax regulation would prompt federal action to
dismantle the scheme of regulatory competition might similarly prevent excessive deregulation. See Tamar Frankel, The Dual State-Federal Regulation of
Financial Institutions—A Policy Proposal, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 53, 60 (1987).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 58–94.
96. See Bebchuk, supra note 77, at 1438.
97. Of course, these arguments are consistent with the notion that banks
demand inefficiently lax regulations: “specialization” and “innovation” may
simply refer to excessively lax standards in the relevant area. See Elizabeth F.
Brown, E Pluribus Unum—Out of Many, One: Why the United States Needs a
Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 52–57 (2005);
Melanie L. Fein, The Fragmented Depository Institutions System: A Case for
Unification, 29 AM. U. L. REV. 633, 675–700 (1980) (arguing that a dual banking system promotes a race in laxity with respect to safety and soundness regulation).
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“ordinary” political economy factors such as the fear of negative
media attention.98 Regulatory demand for lax regulation may
provide a limited, but socially desirable, counterweight.99 It also provides banks with at least one “escape valve” against the
most oppressive instances of excessive regulation.100 Second,
defenders of dual banking argue that it promotes innovation.
Critics of regulation often claim that regulators have little reason to proactively embrace innovation, because doing so takes
time and effort.101 Limited regulatory competition may encourage regulators to experiment with innovative regulations in order to attract regulated entities.102 Indeed, proponents of dual
banking have linked limited regulatory competition to such innovations as “checking accounts, branch banking, real estate
lending, [and] trust services.”103 Third, limited regulatory competition may cause regulators to specialize in the regulation of
particular types of banks. In particular, defenders of the dual
banking system often note that local banks tend to charter at
the state level, which may be more sensitive to local issues,
whereas national banks tend to adopt national charters.104
98. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 61, at 76–77 (quoting the Federal Reserve stating that ordinarily, monopolistic bank regulation would “have a longterm bias against risk-taking and innovation” because regulators “receive[ ] no
plaudits for contributing to economic growth through facilitating prudent risktaking, but [they are] severely criticized for too many bank failures.”); see also
Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual
Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 716 (1988); Kenneth E. Scott, The
Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV.
1, 36 (1977).
99. See Scott, supra note 98, at 36 (noting that regulatory competition in
banking generally results in “broader operating authority” of banks and “fewer
constraints on profitability,” and noting arguments that this may be desirable
because it offsets the tendency towards excessive regulation).
100. See GEORGE J. BENSTON ET AL., PERSPECTIVES ON SAFE AND SOUND
BANKING: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 274 (1986); WILLIAM J. BROWN, THE
DUAL BANKING SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 64 –65 (1968); MACEY ET AL.,
supra note 61, at 111–22; Scott, supra note 98, at 36.
101. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 91, at 84 –94.
102. See Wilmarth, supra note 83, at 1156.
103. See id.
104. See, e.g., SUSAN HOFFMANN, POLITICS AND BANKING: IDEAS, PUBLIC
POLICY, AND THE CREATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 70–83 (2001) (noting
that theorists have argued that state regulation of local banks is preferable
because regulators are closer to customers); PETER J. WALLISON, STATE BANKING REGULATION AND DEREGULATION 6–9 (1985); Elizabeth R. Schiltz, Damming Watters: Channeling the Power of Federal Preemption of State Consumer
Banking Laws, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 893, 907 (2008) (describing this argument by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) to justify broad
preemption).
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Others have extended this argument to defend horizontal regulatory competition among competing federal bank regulators.105
The securities regulation literature offers similar political
economy arguments in favor of regulatory competition. For instance, proponents of regulatory competition in securities law
argue that ordinary monopolistic regulation has resulted in the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) regulatory ineptness, such as its historical refusal to permit firms to disclose
projected earnings.106 Regulatory competition might improve
securities regulation by promoting innovations such as the increased use of default rules or a greater role for regulation by
exchanges.107 It also could allow different regulators to specialize in different types of issuers.108
3. Regulating the Regulatory Market
The forces of regulatory supply and demand may sometimes produce inefficiently lax regulation. In particular, regulated entities may demand regulation that is excessively laissez-faire, and regulators may be willing to supply such
regulation in order to capture the “business” of regulated entities. This process may even trigger a “race to the bottom” as
regulators compete with each other to offer less and less intrusive regulatory schemes.109 In some cases, however, structural
elements of regulatory markets offset this risk. Such design
features of regulatory markets effectively “regulate” the market
for regulatory competition.110 Consider several examples.
First, and most obviously, a system of regulatory competition may incorporate safeguards that limit the capacity or willingness of competing regulators to deregulate beyond a certain
point. Such safeguards are an important way in which banking
105. One study, for instance, found that banks that specialize in consumer
loans tend to shift to the OCC, banks that specialize in commercial loans shift
to the Federal Reserve, and banks that specialize in real estate construction
loans tend to switch to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and
state charters. Richard J. Rosen, Is Three a Crowd? Competition Among Regulators in Banking, 35 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 967, 990 (2003).
106. Romano, supra note 74, at 2378–79.
107. See id. at 2395–401.
108. See Choi, supra note 80, at 1705.
109. Bebchuk, supra note 77, at 1438.
110. Cf. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 21, at 15 (noting that law markets
convert ordinary mandatory rules in contract law into default rules, but noting
that it is possible that “the law market would create a new category [of ] supermandatory laws” wherein judges refuse to accept choice of law provisions on
some issues).
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regulation attempts to prevent regulatory competition from inducing excessive deregulation of safety and soundness.111 For
example, the Federal Reserve sets reserve requirements for all
depository institutions, irrespective of their chosen regulator.112
This ensures that the forces of regulatory competition do not
impact reserve requirements—a central element of banks’ safety and soundness—by removing this issue from the domain of
regulatory competition.113 Similarly, deposit insurance in banking may help safeguard against a race to the bottom in safety
and soundness, as the FDIC offers such insurance to all banks
and monitors the financial health of its policyholders.114
Recently, and especially in light of the global financial
meltdown of 2008, banking commentators have also proposed
safeguards against a race to the bottom in more conventional
consumer protection arenas, such as predatory lending and unfair/inefficient contract design. The most notable such safeguard would create a new federal consumer protection agency
with broad rule-making authority to protect banking consumers.115 The agency would have authority to set a regulatory
floor for all banks on a variety of consumer protection issues,
but would permit competing regulators to go beyond that floor
in their own domains.116 A different proposal would create suit-

111. Although the text focuses on safeguards in banking, safeguards
against excessive deregulation in others areas also exist. For instance, some
understand federal securities laws as a check on state corporate law’s domain
of competition. See Roe, supra note 33, at 592 (describing how federal securities law restricts the competition in which states can practically and legally
engage); Brett McDonnell, The Ambiguous Virtues of Federalism in Corporate
Law 1 (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 03-10, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=424681.
112. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980, 12 U.S.C. § 461 (2006).
113. See Butler & Macey, supra note 98, at 689.
114. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 61, at 147 (describing restrictions that
the FDIC imposes on state banks with deposit insurance).
115. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 91, at 98–100 (proposing that financial
products should be treated as ordinary consumer products, which must be approved as safe by the Consumer Products Safety Commission); cf. Daniel
Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance
Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1397–98 (2007) (proposing that insurance policies should be envisioned as products and that products liability law
can usefully serve as a model for the role of judicial regulation of those products).
116. See Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 1880,
111th Cong. (2009).
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ability standards for the sale of mortgages.117 Because the proposal would create a private cause of action for violations, it
would empower the judiciary to check the risk of lax enforcement due to regulatory competition.118
These safeguards operate on regulatory supply, as they attempt to influence how competing regulators respond to industry demands. But regulatory competition schemes can also be
designed to improve regulatory demand for effective regulation.119 This is particularly true with respect to solvency regulation, where potential regulatory failures are relatively easy to
spot ex post. The best example of this approach to structuring a
system of regulatory competition is the risk-based deposit insurance that the FDIC attempts to charge to regulated
banks.120 Such deposit insurance, if priced accurately to reflect
expected payouts, should increase banks’ willingness to choose
an effective safety and soundness regulator.121 That is because
such a scheme forces banks to internalize ex ante the expected
social costs of their insolvency risk.
II. REGULATORY DEMAND AND INSURANCE
Regulatory competition transforms regulated business entities into “customers” by empowering them to shop in a market
comprised of different regulators.122 As with any market, these
customers’ preferences are central to predicting the market’s
outputs.123 If regulators’ customers prefer regulators that efficiently promote regulatory objectives, then a race—or at least a
117. See Kathleen C. Engel & Pat A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The
Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1318–67
(2002); Jonathan Macey et al., Helping Law Catch Up to Markets: Applying
Broker-Dealer Law to Subprime Markets, 34 J. CORP. L. 789, 814 –31 (2009).
118. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 117, at 1337, 1357.
119. Yet another approach is to limit the consequences of insufficient regulation by enhancing market discipline. Whether this counts as “regulating the
regulatory” market is questionable, though, as this approach essentially attempts to limit the need for regulation rather than to ensure that regulatory
competition produces desirable regulation.
120. See Butler & Macey, supra note 98, at 699.
121. See id. at 712–16. Of course, setting accurate risk-based premiums is
exceedingly difficult for the government due to political factors. See MACEY ET
AL., supra note 61, at 279–88 .
122. See O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 21, at 14 (“The law market fundamentally alters the political process to the extent that it makes people ‘consumers’ or ‘buyers’ of laws rather than simply voters.”).
123. See Fox, supra note 82, at 1342 (“The obvious starting point for an inquiry into the social welfare effects of adopting issuer choice is to ask what
kind of disclosure regime each U.S. issuer would select if given the choice.”).
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crawl—to the top is virtually inevitable. By contrast, if these
customers view regulation as an unnecessary obstacle and cost,
then regulatory choice will promote deregulation irrespective of
its desirability.124
Although the nature of firms’ regulatory demand is important for evaluating any system of regulatory competition, it is
particularly crucial with respect to schemes, such as the SLS,
that envision numerous competing regulators. As the number
of competing jurisdictions increases, the likelihood that at least
one of those jurisdictions will implement a regulatory scheme
that meets customers’ demands increases as well.125 So too does
the competitive pressure on regulators to satisfy regulatory
demand. A large number of competing regulators can consequently produce a powerful “race to the top” when firm demand
for regulation is aligned with regulatory objectives. For similar
reasons, though, a substantial number of competing regulators
also increases the risk of a race to the bottom when firms demand minimal regulation irrespective of regulatory goals.
This Part takes up the issue of insurer “demand,” evaluating the extent to which insurers who were empowered to choose
among competing regulators would do so in a way that benefited the intended beneficiaries of insurance regulation. Section
A focuses on consumer-policyholders, the primary intended beneficiaries of insurance regulation. It contends that life insurers and property/casualty insurers that provide personal lines
of coverage could be expected to “demand” lax consumer protections in a scheme of regulatory competition. This is so irrespective of whether such demand would actually benefit policyholders. Section B then considers two other potential beneficiaries
of insurance regulation: insurers and third parties. It argues
that insurer demand for competing regulators would ignore
third party interests, such as limiting social insurance payments and compensating tort victims. It also suggests that insurer demand would do little to directly advance the interests
of insurers themselves, at least aside from reducing regulatory
restrictions. Importantly, for purposes of analytical clarity, the
analysis in this Part proceeds on the assumption that regulation of regulatory markets—such as guarantee funds and mar-

124. If regulators’ customers endorse some forms of efficient regulations
but not others, then regulatory choice is likely to promote a regime that mimics these preferences. See Bebchuk, supra note 77, at 1458–68.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 94–97.
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ket-based bonding mechanisms—are not present. These issues
are addressed separately in Part IV.
A. REGULATORY DEMAND AND CONSUMER PROTECTION IN
INSURANCE MARKETS
Consumer protection is the central objective of insurance
regulation.126 Indeed, most of the core functions of insurance
regulators are directed primarily toward this goal, and regulation of commercial lines of coverage (where policyholders tend
to be much more sophisticated) is limited.127 For instance, form
and price regulations attempt to ensure that policyholders receive reasonable policy terms at fair prices that are not unduly
discriminatory.128 Claims handling regulations are intended to
protect insureds by limiting insurers’ ability to deny or delay
claim payments.129 Licensing is designed to ensure that market
actors have sufficient expertise and resources to advise and in126. See Donald Cleasby & Nancy M. Schroeder, Regulatory Reform: The
Consequences of “Baby Steps”, 18 J. INS. REG. 288, 292–93 (2000).
127. See id. at 292 (distinguishing between regulation of personal and
commercial lines of insurance). The primary role of regulation in commercial
lines of insurance is solvency regulation. Regulatory Restructuring: Enhancing
Consumer Financial Products Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Entities of the H.
Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) [hereinafter Regulatory
Restructuring] (statement of Gary E. Hughes, Exec. Vice President & General
Counsel, American Council of Life Insurers). This role for insurance regulation
can be justified as a credible commitment device for insurers. See infra text
accompanying notes 145–46, 187–90.
128. Many states review and preapprove insurers’ policy forms. This
process is designed to protect consumers from unfair or surprising terms that
may result from the adhesive nature of insurance policies. See Schwarcz, supra note 115, at 1424. With respect to insurers’ pricing, most states require
insurers in some consumer lines of insurance, particularly homeowners and
auto insurance, to have rate changes approved by state regulators, though the
degree and intrusiveness of this regulation differs dramatically among states.
See infra text accompanying notes 223–31.
129. Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case
Study of the British and American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict,
83 TUL. L. REV. 735, 745 (2009) (discussing the law’s role in preventing improper practices of insurers). Every state has an Unfair Claims Practices Act that
gives the state regulator authority to impose fees or issue cease-and-desist orders in cases of flagrant or repeated unfair claims practices. Id. at 750 & n.65.
Unfair claims practices include a wide range of potential conduct, such as failing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation, knowingly
misrepresenting facts or policy terms, and failing to effectuate prompt, fair,
and equitable settlement of claims submitted in which liability has become
reasonably clear. KATHLEEN HEALD ETTINGER ET AL., STATE INSURANCE REGULATION 90–97 (1995).
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sure policyholders.130 And even solvency regulation is primarily
defended on the grounds that it protects policyholders from the
risk that insurers will not have the financial strength to pay future claims.131 This stands in stark contrast with prudential
regulation in banking (known as “safety and soundness” regulation), which is primarily justified not by consumer protection
rationales, but by the need to limit bank runs and other forms
of systemic risk.132
This section analyzes whether insurers operating in consumer-oriented markets would choose among competing regulators in a way that promoted the interests of policyholders. It
first shows that this depends largely on the extent to which insurance consumers would know, and rationally respond to, insurers’ choices among competing regulators. It then shows that
most insurance consumers in a scheme of regulatory competition would be unlikely to be sophisticated about insurers’ regulatory choices. Additionally, this section also raises the possibility that allowing insurers to choose among different regulators
may itself undermine the commitment function of consumer
protections, even if insurers’ consumers were fully informed
and rational about the selection of a regulatory regime.
In sum, this section therefore suggests that insurers would
choose among competing regulators in much the same way that
many claim banks have chosen among competing regulators in
credit card markets: by selecting the least intrusive regime
available.133 In large part, this is because the intended beneficiaries of insurance regulation are ordinary consumers rather
than the relatively sophisticated intended beneficiaries of corporate and securities law.

130. ETTINGER ET AL., supra note 129, at 174 –89 (explaining the licensing
process and requirements).
131. See Regulatory Restructuring, supra note 127 (“The primary objective
of insurance regulation is solvency, which is the most important consumer
protection of all.”). But see infra Part II.B.2. Solvency regulation establishes
guarantee funds and limits the investments that insurers can make, the capital they can deploy, and the accounting methods they can use. See Steven W.
Pottier & David W. Sommer, The Effectiveness of Public and Private Sector
Summary Risk Measures in Predicting Insurer Insolvencies, 21 J. FIN. SERV.
RES. 101, 103–04 (2000) (listing these goals as factors in measuring risk of insolvency).
132. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 61, at 112–14 (providing background on
this type of regulation).
133. See text accompanying notes 86–90.
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1. The Character of Insurers’ Regulatory Demand
a. Policyholder Sophistication About Insurers’ Regulatory
Choices
Insurers’ demand for competing regulators would be driven
largely by policyholders’ demand for competing insurers. In
particular, insurers’ regulatory choices would depend largely on
how sophisticated their policyholders were about those regulatory choices.134 If policyholders were “unsophisticated” about insurers’ regulatory choices—either because they were unaware
of these choices or failed to appreciate their implications—then
insurers would demand regulatory regimes with minimalist
consumer protections. Such a regime would decrease insurers’
regulatory compliance costs and maximize their choices of
business strategies without any substantial offsetting cost in
policyholder demand. To be sure, it is possible that consumers
would also benefit from the selection of a deregulatory regime,
as their premiums would likely decrease.135 But the key point
here is that insurers with policyholders who were unsophisticated about regulatory choice would favor deregulatory regimes
irrespective of consumers’ interests.136
At least two objections can be levied against the prediction
that insurers would inevitably choose the least restrictive regulatory regime if their consumers were unsophisticated about
their regulatory choices. First, although consumer protections
limit individual insurers’ range of permissible actions, they can
nonetheless promote industry interests by solving collective action and coordination problems.137 For instance, consumer protections may protect the industry’s overall reputation from the
actions of “bad apple” insurers who would ignore the industrywide reputational costs of their own misfeasance.138 Similarly,
134. Cf. Grace & Scott, supra note 7, at 74 (rejecting the single license proposal of Butler and Ribstein because “a key reason for insurance regulation is
consumers’ asymmetric and imperfect information”).
135. See Harrington, supra note 9, at 22–30.
136. Cf. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 21, at 16 (noting that regulatory
competition is a “procedural mechanism that will tend to contribute to more
efficient regulations” by harnessing the power of the markets).
137. The related argument that other forms of regulation aside from consumer protections may benefit insurers is addressed infra Part II.B.1.
138. See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 7 (2d ed. 2008) (describing the race to the bottom that occurred due to insurer-side adverse selection
in the fire insurance market in the late nineteenth century); Daniel Schwarcz,
Differential Compensation and the “Race to the Bottom” in Consumer Insurance Markets, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 723, 742–45 (2009) (arguing that a similar
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consumer protections may increase overall demand for insurance by warranting that all available coverage meets certain
minimum standards, thereby reducing consumer search
costs.139 If consumer protections benefit insurers, then insurers
might select robust regulatory regimes irrespective of their
consumers’ knowledge.
Interestingly, though, the fact that consumer protections
might benefit insurers’ collective interests does not undermine
the prediction that insurers competing in a market comprised
of policyholders who were unsophisticated about regulatory
choice would demand minimalist regulation.140 This is because
insurers who were choosing among competing regulatory regimes would ignore, or at least largely discount, these potential
industry-wide benefits of consumer protection in choosing
among competing regulators. These industry-wide benefits
from consumer protections arise from the capacity of consumer
protections to solve collective action problems by limiting the
permissible range of choices available to individual insurers.
But regulatory choice—at least when it is not tethered to firms’
geographic sales or operations141—eliminates these collective
action benefits from regulation. It does so because it is unable
to prevent individual firms from “cheating” from the collective
optimum by defecting to (i.e., choosing) a competing regulator.
In other words, regulatory choice is a fundamentally unstable
solution to prisoner’s dilemma games, because it cannot prevent cheating by individual players.
The second objection is that insurers might choose a relatively robust regulatory regime to improve the coverage they
offer to consumers. Even if consumers were not directly aware
race to the bottom may characterize insurers’ claims handling practices in the
current market). Even policyholders who were unsophisticated about specific
insurers’ regulatory choices might be influenced by media reports or other stories about insurers’ bad practices. See id. at 740.
139. MARTIN F. GRACE & ROBERT W. KLEIN, THE EFFECTS OF AN OPTIONAL
FEDERAL CHARTER ON COMPETITION IN THE LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 26–29
(2007) (considering consumer benefits of regulation and stating that many insurers have expressed a desire for increased regulation).
140. As is true of all the analysis in Parts II and III, this assumes that
there are no “safeguards” in place to prevent this result. In particular, it assumes that firms are not required to pay for the consequences of other firms’
insolvencies via guarantee funds and are not charged actuarially fair prices for
deposit insurance. These safeguards, and their potential effectiveness at inducing firms to seek out improved regulation, are addressed separately in Part
IV.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 34–38.
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of their insurer’s regulatory choice, they might nonetheless be
indirectly responsive to the improvements that resulted from
that choice. The key problem with this objection, though, is that
it inverts the usual logic of regulatory competition—that principals can monitor and discipline regulatory choices even when
they cannot monitor the behavior that is subject to that regulation.142 This inversion ultimately supports the absence of any
consumer protection regulation whatsoever, rather than regulatory competition.143
Although insurers would inevitably pursue weak consumer
protections if their consumers were uninformed about their
regulatory choices, the converse is not necessarily true. In fact,
insurers might pursue inefficiently lax consumer protection regimes even if their consumers were sophisticated about insurers’ regulatory choices.144 For informed and sophisticated policyholders, a key benefit of consumer protections is that they
enhance the credibility of insurers’ commitments.145 The sequential and contingent nature of insurance means that even
insurers that want to commit to paying claims in the future
may have difficulty doing so, especially in markets (such as life
insurance) where commitments are long term.146 Most potential
142. See Romano, supra note 74, at 2367 (“[A] theoretical need for government regulation to prevent market failure is not equivalent to a need for a
monopolist regulator.”). Even if market forces are insufficient to protect insureds against risks such as unfair claims handling and exploitive policy forms,
Schwarcz, supra note 115, at 1403–12, it does not necessarily follow that they
are insufficient to effectively constrain insurers’ choices among competing regulators.
143. As I have argued at length elsewhere, there are good reasons for consumer protections in insurance. Schwarcz, supra note 138, at 726–27. Indeed,
defenders of regulatory competition in its most robust forms argue that it offers a procedural mechanism that increases the chances of reaching the efficient substantive outcome whatever the nature of that outcome. See O’HARA &
RIBSTEIN, supra note 21, at 199–215.
144. But see GRACE & KLEIN, supra note 139, at 3 (“Some have expressed
concerns that an OFC would lead to competition between federal and state
regulators that would ultimately degrade rather than improve insurance regulation. However, we argue that if good regulation benefits consumers and they
value these benefits, then insurers will be motivated to seek optimal regulatory jurisdictions that would increase rather than diminish firm value.”); Butler
& Ribstein, supra note 4, at 40.
145. Other explanations for consumer protections do not substantially benefit informed consumers who do not need regulatory protections to locate an
insurer that offers the coverage they desire. See Schwarcz, supra note 138, at
725–26 (contrasting sophisticated and ordinary consumers).
146. David Moss, Risk, Responsibility, and the Role of Government, 56
DRAKE L. REV. 541, 546–48 (2008) (noting the import of commitment problems
to the government’s role in insurance markets); Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith”
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options for making credible commitments—such as investing
heavily in a brand or acquiring ratings from private entities—
are imperfect. Regulation can supplement these commitment
devices with the prospect of legal sanctions in the event of broken commitments.
Regulatory competition of the type envisioned in OFC and
SLS schemes could undermine this commitment device by allowing insurers to switch regulators in the future. For instance,
an insurer looking to make a credible long-term commitment to
policyholders by selecting a stringent financial regulator would
be unable to do so, because it would always have the option of
changing its selection in the future. This problem could likely
be remedied by allowing firms to commit to a particular regulatory regime. But doing so might undermine some of the ostensible benefits of regulatory competition in the first place and
raise a host of practical issues.
b. The Requisite Degree of Policyholder Sophistication About
Insurers’ Regulatory Choices
Predicting the nature of insurers’ choices among competing
regulatory regimes is complicated by the fact that potential policyholders are neither completely informed nor completely uninformed about those choices. In reality, some insurance purchasers in a scheme of regulatory competition would be
“sophisticated” about insurers’ regulatory choices, and others
would not be. Assessing what level of consumer sophistication
would correspond to what percentage of insurers pursuing policyholder interests in their regulatory choices is a complicated
and speculative enterprise.
Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely that a small percentage
of sophisticated consumers could discipline a large percentage
of insurers to select a robust regulatory scheme.147 Ironically,
Breach of Contract by First-Party Insurers, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 418–19
(1996) (discussing commitment problems associated with the prompt and fair
payment of claims).
147. The “informed minority” argument is important in contract law. R.
Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of the Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635,
646–48 (1998); see also Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information
in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1389 (1983). Much of the analysis is identical for
choice of regulators in a scheme of regulatory competition, which can itself be
understood simply as one type of choice that could be contractually specified.
As such, it is hardly surprising that defenders of regulatory competition invoke the informed minority argument to argue that firms will make choices
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this is partially due to the intense price competition that characterizes most consumer insurance markets.148 Insurers that
select a less intrusive regulatory regime will enjoy a competitive advantage over other insurers in attracting the business of
unsophisticated consumers, as they could partially pass on to
these consumers the cost savings associated with lax regulation. Unlike sophisticated consumers, who would decide whether they were willing to pay higher premiums for enhanced consumer protections, “unsophisticated” consumers would tend to
purchase their coverage from these low-cost insurers irrespective of their actual willingness to pay for consumer protections.
That is because only one side of the relevant tradeoff—the decrease in premiums—would be visible to those consumers.
The experience of fire insurance companies in the late nineteenth century is illustrative. In the absence of form regulation, fire insurers that sold highly limited coverage began to
drive other fire insurers with more comprehensive coverage out
of the marketplace, as consumers could not differentiate the
quality of coverage that these competing insurers offered and
so based their purchasing decisions largely on price. The resulting fire insurance coverage was riddled with exceptions, resulting in largely illusory coverage for many policyholders until
states adopted a mandatory fire insurance policy.149 Similarly,
price regulation in insurance markets was originally justified
as a way of ensuring that insurance prices did not become too
low to support policy payments due to “ruinous” price competition.150 Such ruinous competition allegedly resulted in the failures of insurance companies from the San Francisco Earthquake of 1908 to Hurricane Andrew of 1994 precisely because
most consumers, unaware of their insurers’ financial strength,
that are consonant with their consumers’ preferences. See, e.g., O’HARA &
RIBSTEIN, supra note 21, at 35.
148. See Jeffrey R. Brown & Austan Goolsbee, Does the Internet Make Markets More Competitive? Evidence from the Life Insurance Industry, 110 J. POL.
ECON. 481, 482–83 (2002) (term life); J. David Cummins, Property-Liability
Insurance Price Deregulation: The Last Bastion?, in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE 2–3 (J. David Cummins ed., 2002) (propertyliability); Paul T. Joskow, Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the PropertyLiability Insurance Industry, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 375, 391 (1973)
(property-liability).
149. See BAKER, supra note 138, at 7 (explaining the relationship in the
market between limited coverage, or “lemon,” and comprehensive coverage, or
“peach,” fire insurance policies).
150. See MEIER, supra note 38, at 60–73 (chronicling the historical development of insurance regulation).
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gravitated to the cheapest coverage available.151 Although insurers have used this argument to justify collusive pricing, the
underlying concern is legitimate.152
In sum, whether market forces would effectively discipline
insurers’ choices among competing regulators depends largely
on the extent to which insurance consumers would know, and
rationally respond to, insurers’ choices among competing regulators. Regulatory competition may degrade consumer protections even if policyholders are generally informed about regulatory choices. But regulatory competition is sure to produce
weaker consumer protections to the extent that most consumers are ill-informed about their insurers’ regulatory choices.
2. Consumer Sophistication and Insurer Regulatory Demand
Determining how well-informed insurance consumers
would be about insurers’ choices of regulators in a scheme of
regulatory competition is fundamentally a prediction about
consumer information in a hypothetical market setting. But the
basic features of both personal property/casualty lines and life
insurance markets provide strong reason to believe that a substantial majority of consumers would not meaningfully take into account insurers’ choices of regulatory regimes in making
their purchasing decisions. First, and most importantly, there
is little reason to expect that consumers would be familiar with
the information necessary to meaningfully evaluate insurers’
choices of regulatory regimes. Second, even consumers armed
with this information would have a limited capacity to use it to
make informed purchasing decisions. This section considers
each reason in turn.
a. Information and Regulatory Choice
Consumers must know more than simply the identity of an
insurer’s choice of regulator in order to evaluate that choice.153
Without a sense of the relative quality of different regulators’
consumer protections, consumers would have no basis for interpreting an insurer’s selection of a regulator. Yet the charac151. See id. at 59–60 (describing the former).
152. See MEIER, supra note 38, at 59–60; Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at
54 –57.
153. Any scheme of regulatory competition would presumably be accompanied by a requirement that insurers disclose their chosen regulator. See, e.g.,
Romano, supra note 74, at 2413 (proposing that firms would need to disclose
which regulator they selected).
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ter of consumers’ insurance purchases makes it very unlikely
that a substantial percentage of consumers would consider and
be able to interpret this information when choosing among
competing insurers.
First, consumers choosing among competing insurers generally conduct only minimally time consuming and cognitively
taxing independent research that does not rely on market intermediaries such as insurance agents. The majority of consumers in automobile and homeowner insurance markets report that family and friends are their primary source of
information about competing insurers.154 Other common
sources of information, including insurance company literature,
advertisements, television, and the yellow pages, similarly require minimal research and effort from consumers.155 Recently,
more consumers also report using internet platforms such as
einsurance.com in selecting among competing insurers.156 By
contrast, a very small percentage of insurance consumers report conducting more extensive independent research of competing insurers: only three percent report consulting state government hotlines and only seven percent report using
consumer-oriented magazines.157 Perhaps even more notably,
such consumers generally found these sources of information

154. See Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable
Expectations Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 295, 311 (1998) (citing INS. RESEARCH
COUNCIL, PUBLIC ATTITUDE MONITOR 1995 at 15 fig.2-7, 31 fig.2-27 and giving
data that fifty-one percent of homeowner insureds and fifty-four percent of auto insureds relied on word of mouth to learn about insurance, more than all
other sources of information). A similar 2001 study found that, for auto insurance, fifty-six percent of recent consumers relied on the recommendations of
someone they knew, and ninety-eight percent of them stated that this information was somewhat or very valuable. See Schwarcz, supra note 115, at 1413
(citing INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, PUBLIC ATTITUDE MONITOR 2001, Issue 2, at
6 fig.2-5). As in 1995, insureds did not cite any other source of information as
frequently as a basis for their decision. Id. Insurance is one arena where such
advice is usually close to useless, as the vast majority of consumers never use
the most important features of the insurance that they purchase. Cf.
Schwarcz, supra note 138, at 737–38 (discussing consumer behaviors). For
that reason, it is hardly surprising that virtually all consumers report being
satisfied with their auto and homeowners insurance. See Schwarcz, supra note
115, at 1413.
155. See Thomas, supra note 154, at 313.
156. See Randy E. Dumm & Robert E. Hoyt, Insurance Distribution Channels: Markets in Transition, 22 J. INS. REG. 27, 28 (2003) (noting that the internet channel “was growing at an explosive rate”).
157. See Thomas, supra note 154, at 312–14 (providing 1995 data).
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less useful than more accessible sources of information, such as
advice from friends and family.158
When consumers do conduct independent research, they
focus principally on price. One recent study found that only ten
percent of automobile insurance customers reported selecting a
carrier that did not offer the lowest price.159 Price distinctions
are obviously easy for consumers to understand and compare.
Consumers who choose among competing carriers for reasons
other than price do not generally do so because their independent research has revealed relevant nonprice information. Rather, they do so because they personally received poor service
or experienced a claims problem.160
The evidence from life insurance markets largely mirrors
the evidence from property/casualty markets. Studies of life insurance purchasing decisions prior to the advent of the Internet
tended to find that the vast majority of consumers did not comparison shop or read literature other than that provided by
their insurers. In one study of 194 respondents, none reported
reviewing independent financial strength ratings in purchasing
their coverage, two reported consulting popular press like Consumer Reports, and one reported contacting the state insurance
commissioner.161 The overwhelming majority of survey respondents chose a life insurer based on the recommendations of others.162 More recent research finds a significant amount of comparison shopping based on price in the term life insurance
market, which has helped to lower premiums substantially.
However, it finds limited evidence of such comparison shopping
in the whole life insurance markets, where products are much
more complicated and heterogeneous.163

158. See Schwarcz, supra note 115, at 1413, 1416 (citing INS. RESEARCH
COUNCIL, PUBLIC ATTITUDE MONITOR 2001, Issue 2, at 6 fig.2-5 that ninetyeight percent found useful information from family and friends compared to
only ninety percent for that from insurance agents).
159. See J.D. POWER & ASSOCS., 2009 INSURANCE SHOPPING STUDY, http://
www.jdpower.com/insurance/articles/2009-Insurance-Shopping-Study; see also
Dumm & Hoyt, supra note 156, at 35 fig.1 (citing 2001 survey by J.D. Power
and Associates indicating that cost savings may not greatly influence decision
making).
160. See Dumm & Hoyt, supra note 156, at 36 fig.2 (noting thirty-four percent were “event-driven”).
161. See Roger A. Formisano et al., Choice Strategies in Difficult Task Environments, 8 J. CONSUMER RES. 474, 476 (1982).
162. See id. at 477.
163. See Brown & Goolsbee, supra note 148, at 503.
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Consumers’ general lack of effort in independently researching competing insurers is hardly surprising given the
circumstances under which they tend to select among competing insurers. Nonprice distinctions among competing insurers
are complex, contingent, and difficult to interpret.164 Yet firsttime decisions among competing insurers are generally made
during eventful and stressful times in peoples’ lives.165 In the
property/casualty context, consumers first select a carrier when
they buy a home or automobile, or move.166 First-time life insurance decisions are often made when people take a new job or
have a sudden change in family structure. And once consumers
select an insurer, they tend not to switch unless they can save a
substantial amount of money from doing so.167
The second reason why consumers’ purchasing decisions
would be unlikely to reflect insurers’ regulatory decisions is
that market intermediaries could not be relied upon to advise
consumers about this issue. Only a small percentage of consumers in life insurance markets and about half in property/casualty lines now purchase insurance through independent
agents. Instead, consumer markets are increasingly populated
by captive agents and direct writers, who only offer coverage
with a single insurer. This distribution mechanism tends to
produce cost savings that can be passed on to consumers, but it
eliminates expert advice about choosing among competing carriers.168 Even consumers who do purchase insurance through
independent agents often receive slanted advice about competing insurers.169 Most independent insurance agents receive con164. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 77 (2008) (“The
benefits from holding insurance are delayed, the probability of having a claim
is hard to analyze, consumers do not get useful feedback on whether they are
getting a good return on their insurance purchases, and mapping from what
they are buying to what they are getting can be ambiguous.”).
165. Consumers making decisions under these circumstances rationally
“adopt simple choice strategies” that balance “the desire to achieve accuracy
with the desire to minimize effort.” Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality,
Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203,
1223–34 (2003).
166. See Dumm & Hoyt, supra note 156, at 36 fig.2 (noting thirty-four percent were “event-driven”).
167. See id. at 34.
168. See Laureen Regan & Sharon Tennyson, Insurance Distribution Systems, in HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 709, 712–17 tbls.1 & 3 (Georges Dionne
ed., 2000) (16.4% and 49.7%, respectively).
169. See Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure: The Case for Banning Contingent Commissions, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 289, 296–303 (2007) (discussing these agents “inefficient steering” to suboptimal plans).
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tingent commission payments or other forms of differential
compensation from insurers based on the amount of business
they direct to the insurer.170 These payments create incentives
for independent agents to steer consumers to specific insurers
who pay the highest kickback and to consolidate their clients
with a limited number of insurers.171 They consequently undermine the extent to which independent agents can be relied
upon to offer objective advice about competing carriers.
Third, and finally, neither advertising nor disclosure requirements could be expected to meaningfully inform a large
percentage of consumers about insurers’ regulatory choices. Information about the relative quality of different jurisdictions’
consumer protections is both controversial and complex. Its
complexity means that, in order to be effective, any disclosure
regime or advertising campaign would need to discuss the underlying issues by boiling them down to simplistic metrics or
slogans.172 This is entirely possible, of course—rating agencies
such as A.M. Best have developed letter grades that are intended to reflect the financial health of individual insurers.173
But in contrast to financial ratings, where there is substantial
agreement at least with respect to the basics,174 any rating of a
jurisdiction’s regulatory “quality” could be immensely subjective, depending in large part on the political philosophy of the
entity doing the rating.175 As a result, different ratings organi170. See Schwarcz, supra note 138, at 727–32 (elaborating on these compensation schemes).
171. Id.
172. See Aaron D. Twerski et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability—Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV.
495, 511–16 (1976) (“Warnings, in order to be effective, must be selective.”).
173. Cf. Tom Baker & David Moss, Government as Risk Manager, in NEW
PRINCIPLES ON REGULATION 99 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009),
(discussing government standards and private marketing slogans that convey
complex messages simply).
174. The “rating process involves a comprehensive quantitative and qualitative analysis of a company’s balance sheet strength, operating performance
and business profile. This includes comparisons to peers and industry standards as well as assessments of operating plans, philosophy and management.” A.M. Best, Best’s Credit Rating Methodology, http://www.ambest.com/
ratings/methodology.asp (last visited Mar. 7, 2010).
175. Some have tried to rate the enforcement of different countries’ corporate and securities law. See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J.
POL. ECON. 1113, 1115 (1998). But rating the content of the laws themselves is
an entirely different matter from rating enforcement efforts, where factors
such as the number of enforcement actions can be used to generate quantitative metrics. Id. at 1140. Moreover, these ratings have themselves been sharply criticized by many scholars. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Kon Sik Kim, Es-
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zations could easily have largely inconsistent ratings of different regulators, and challenging the accuracy of these different
ratings would be costly and difficult.
Ultimately, of course, the percentage of consumerpolicyholders who would be familiar with their insurer’s regulatory selection would depend on numerous factors. These include
the specific insurance market at issue, the number of competing regulators, and the extent to which any of these regulators
invested in developing a particular reputation with consumers
and/or insurers. But this section gives good reason to be skeptical that a substantial percentage of policyholders would be so
informed, given the manner in which consumers shop for insurance and the complex and subjective nature of the underlying information.
b. Consumer Decisionmaking and Regulatory Choice
Even if consumers were reasonably well-informed about
the relative quality of insurers’ choices of regulatory regimes,
they would have substantial difficulties in assessing the implications of those choices for their own purchasing decisions.
Consumers only care about an insurers’ regulatory regime insofar as it provides them with better coverage or lower costs. But
the relationship between insurance regulation and these two
variables—particularly the former—is complicated and contestable.176 It requires an appreciation of the risks involved in
insurance transactions, and the extent to which regulation effectively mitigates those risks.177 Simply put, many consumers
do not have this appreciation of insurance regulation.
Not only would consumers have difficulty mapping insurers’ regulatory choices into substantive outcomes, but they
would be prone to underestimating the benefits that enhanced
regulation could produce in terms of better coverage.178 Behatablishing a New Stock Market for Shareholder Value Oriented Firms in Korea, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 277, 281–82 (2002).
176. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 164, at 75–76 (describing this as
mapping from choices to outcomes).
177. It is for precisely this reason that regulators still regulate insurers’
solvency and organize guarantee funds even though it is relatively easy for
consumers to get objective measures of different insurers’ financial strength.
See supra note 174.
178. There is a substantial body of literature documenting the fact that
there is a “systematic tendency for insurance in practice to differ from insurance in theory.” David M. Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, Extending the Theory
to Meet the Practice of Insurance 3 (Harvard Univ., Working Paper 2004); see
also Howard Kunreuther & Mark V. Pauly, Rules Rather Than Discretion:
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vioral research reveals that individuals systematically underestimate the likelihood that they will suffer an insurable loss.
Studies have repeatedly shown that people are ordinarily overly optimistic that they will not be injured in an earthquake,179
be involved in a car accident,180 suffer from health problems,181
or die young.182 Such over-optimism “is a pervasive feature of
human life” in general.183 Of course, competing factors—such as
recent events that make bad outcomes particularly available—
can push probability estimates in the other direction. But overoptimism tends to be a robust phenomenon that has been repeatedly documented in insurance decisions in particular. Such
over-optimism produces an artificially depressed assessment of
the value of regulatory protections, which only matter when,
and if, consumers suffer a loss.

Lessons from Hurricane Katrina (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. W12503, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=927387. Much of this literature is of limited applicability to the
problems in this Article for two reasons. First, the normative implications of
these departures from rational actor models are not always clear. Although
government policy clearly ought to respond to simple errors in insurance decision making, such as underestimation of risks, many behavioral anomalies are
not so easily described as errors, rather than preferences. See Daniel
Schwarcz, Regulating Consumer Demand in Insurance, ERASMUS L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1572908 (arguing
that consumer deviations from expected utility theory in the insurance realm
are often the results of mistakes, but that these deviations can also frequently
be explained as sophisticated behavior). Second, many behavioral anomalies
would have an ambiguous impact on how consumers would evaluate insurers’
regulatory choices in a system of regulatory competition.
179. Jerry M. Burger & Michele L. Palmer, Changes in and Generalization
of Unrealistic Optimism Following Experiences with Stressful Events: Reactions to the 1989 California Earthquake, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 39, 40–41 (1992).
180. David Dunning et al., Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of
Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability, 57 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1082, 1082 (2006); Ola Svenson, Are We All
Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 147 (1981).
181. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 807 (1980).
182. See Kyle D. Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How the Law
Should Respond, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 2, 23 (2001).
183. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 164, at 31–33 (noting that such
“unrealistic optimism . . . characterizes most people in most social categories”).
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B. REGULATORY DEMAND AND OTHER BENEFICIARIES OF
INSURANCE REGULATION
Although consumers are the primary intended beneficiaries of insurance regulation, they are not the only such beneficiaries. At least two other potential groups of beneficiaries exist: insurers themselves and third parties outside of the
insurer/policyholder relationship.184 This section examines
these potential beneficiaries, looking at the extent to which “insurer demand” among competing regulators would promote
these interests. It first argues that insurer demand would do
little to promote industry objectives other than reducing regulatory costs. It then argues that insurer demand could be expected to harm the interests of third parties. The protection of
such third parties is an important goal of insurance regulation
even though systemic risk is much less substantial in the insurance domain than the banking domain.
1. Insurers as Beneficiaries of Insurance Regulation
Financial regulation is often claimed to benefit the regulated industry itself, as well as that industry’s consumers and
investors.185 Frequently, such claims are premised on the idea
that consumer protections benefit financial firms by solving collective action or commitment problems.186 Section A showed
why individual insurers’ preferences among competing regulatory regimes could not be expected to promote these goals.187 In
short, regulatory solutions to collective action problems typically require that those solutions are mandatory. By giving insurers choice as to their regulatory scheme, regulatory competition
allows individual insurers to cheat from the collective optimum.188 Regulatory competition would also be unlikely to solve
184. See generally Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 333–34
(1999) (identifying financial regulation as primarily concerned with regulating
risk and protecting consumers/investors and third parties).
185. See Timothy Geithner & Lawrence Summers, A New Financial Foundation, WASH. POST, June 15, 2009, at A15 (describing the Obama Administration’s framework for regulatory modernization of banking, and noting that
such modernization is in the industry’s own interest because it will restore the
public’s trust in the financial system).
186. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 129, at 810 (promoting an independent
dispute resolution entity for consumer insurance lines, and arguing that it
would enhance the insurance industry’s reputation among consumers by restricting the capacity of insurers to unfairly limit or delay claim payments).
187. See supra Part II.A.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 137–43.
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commitment problems given the prospect that an insurer could
change regulatory regimes in the future.189
However, regulation can also promote the interests of regulated entities in more obvious ways. Regulators are sometimes
uniquely situated to provide direct services or products to regulated entities. In some cases, this is because regulators can exploit economies of scale and avoid coordination problems associated with certain services.190 Consider the banking sphere,
where these considerations prompt the Federal Reserve to provide private banks with check-clearing, wire-transfer, and automated clearinghouse transaction services.191 In other cases,
regulators may be well situated to help develop products because of their distinctive expertise, ability to identify common
problems, and obvious ability to navigate regulatory hurdles.
This helps to explain why state bank regulators have themselves developed widely used bank products such as negotiable
order of withdrawal accounts.192 Arguably, modern corporate
law provides another example of such a regulatory service, with
Delaware courts opining at length about voluntary best practices for corporate governance.193
Although insurers’ regulatory demand might promote regulators’ provision of direct services to insurers,194 this is not an
important element of insurance regulation. The reason is that
189. See supra text accompanying notes 143–46.
190. Regulation that facilitates industry coordination should be distinguished from regulatory efforts to coordinate the process of regulation itself.
See generally Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209 (2009).
191. See generally Adam J. Levitin, Public-Private Competition in Payments: The Role of the Federal Reserve (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Working
Paper No. 1420061, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1420061 (arguing that the Federal Reserve serves industry interests by introducing competition into the marketplace where none would exist).
192. See Wilmarth, supra note 83, at 1156.
193. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and
Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833, 848 (2007); Edward B. Rock, Saints and
Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009,
1017 (1997). This form of best practices arguably also exists in securities law.
For instance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides that a public company can
adopt a code of ethics for senior financial officers and have a financial expert
on its audit committee, but can also opt-out of these requirements. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 7264 –7265 (2006).
194. Even here it is possible that externalities and economies of scale may,
in fact, mean that such services are best provided through a single monopolistic regulator. See Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Regulatory Co-Opetition,
in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, supra note 17, at
30, 36–37.
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industry associations already do an excellent job of providing
these services.195 The most important example is the Insurance
Services Office (ISO), which facilitates the drafting of standard
insurance policies and the collection of aggregate loss data.196
Other examples include the Coalition Against Insurance Fraud,
which serves as a national clearinghouse for information about
insurance fraud,197 and the Insurance Marketplace Standards
Association, which develops best practices for life insurers.198
The success of industry associations in providing products
and services that might not otherwise arise in the marketplace
is not a coincidence. Rather, it is a product of the insurance industry’s distinctive history. The insurance industry has been
largely exempt from federal antitrust laws since the McCarran
Ferguson Act was passed in 1945.199 This has allowed private
industry associations to play a large role in identifying common
issues and coordinating activities without facing significant antitrust scrutiny.200 At the same time, insurance regulators have
historically been poorly situated to facilitate industry coordination because those regulators have themselves been uncoordi-

195. Coordination in securities is also significantly facilitated by private
associations. First, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, a private association, sets accounting rules for public disclosures that are adhered to in most
states. See Romano, supra note 74, at 2394. Second, exchanges set various
trading rules that are forms of regulation. See Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be Considered Government
Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151, 153 (2008).
196. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 34 (4th
ed. 2005). Insurers derive substantial value from these services. Aggregating
loss data allows them to more accurately price their policies and evaluate their
exposures to different risks, because it gives them a larger and, therefore,
more reliable data set. Such data pooling would be virtually impossible were it
not for the coordination of policy forms among insurers. This contributes to the
accuracy of data sharing, by ensuring that the underlying loss data is relatively comparable across companies. See id. at 33–34; see also Helping Insurers
Price Their Products, http://www.iso.com/About-ISO/ISO-Services-for-Property
-Casualty-Insurance/Helping-Insurers-Price-Their-Products.html (last visited
Mar. 3, 2010).
197. About the Coalition Against Insurance Fraud, http://www.insurance
fraud.org/aboutus.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010).
198. Insurance Marketplace Standards, Association Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.imsaethics.org/Content/FAQs_47.aspx (last visited Jan.
15, 2010).
199. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 14 –27.
200. Id. at 47–48. Indeed, such industry groups occasionally went too far in
the past, conspiring both to fix prices in conjunction with the sharing of actuarial data and to boycott insurers who refused to move to a claims made policy
form. Id. at 64 –65.
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nated.201 State regulators’ historical lack of coordination helped
induce the industry to develop strong and active industry associations to allow individual insurers to navigate this patchwork
regulatory system.202 This, in turn, has allowed industry associations to take on roles that might otherwise not be efficiently
provided in markets without regulatory competition.
2. Externalities and Third-Party Beneficiaries of Insurance
Regulation
As noted in Part I, there is virtually no reason to expect
that regulated entities would select regulators that provided
the optimal measure of protections to third parties or larger social interests.203 These positive externalities of regulation are
costly to regulated entities and, unlike consumer protections,
provide them with virtually no potential benefit.
Insurance regulation is at least partially intended to benefit third parties to the insurance transaction as well as consumers and insurers.204 For instance, regulations promoting
the payment of liability insurance claims protect accident victims as well as policyholders.205 Regulations in the property insurance sphere shield neighborhoods and families from the
consequences of destroyed homes and businesses.206 And the
regulation of virtually all forms of insurance helps to keep individuals from relying on publicly funded social insurance programs, such as bankruptcy, social security, and unemployment
insurance.207

201. Cf. id. at 72–74 (describing different state regulatory schemes).
202. See Brown, supra note 23, at 4–6 (describing the lack of coordination in
state regulation); see also Helping Insurers Comply with Legal and Regulatory
Requirements, http://www.iso.com/About-ISO/ISO-Services-for-Property-Casualty
-Insurance/Helping-Insurers-Comply-with-Legal-and-Regulatory-Requirements
.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2010).
203. See supra Part I.B.1.
204. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1489 (2010)
(arguing that “insurance policies are not merely contracts but also are designed to perform particular risk management deterrence, and compensation
functions important to economic and social ordering”).
205. See BAKER, supra note 138, at 8, 642.
206. See id.
207. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social
Insurance, and Tort Reform: Towards a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 94 –96 (1993) (describing the interactions between public and private insurance programs).
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Insurance regulation also serves a broader set of social interests in fairness that are not fully captured by the selfinterests of consumers and insurers. For instance, regulations
may forbid the use of certain underwriting classifications, such
as gender, race, and genetics.208 Underlying these prohibitions
is a judgment that people ought not to be financially responsible for certain personal characteristics. Furthermore, insurance
regulation mandates certain types of coverage—such as property insurance coverage for innocent co-insureds or life insurance
coverage for suicides209—at least partially for similar reasons.
Although insurance regulation is indeed partially designed
to protect the interests of third parties to the insurance relationship, this is not a central goal of insurance regulation, as it
is in the banking context. The reason is that insurance—
defined to exclude “insurance” against losses to credit risks210—
generally does not create substantial systemic risks.211 First,
and most importantly, insurance failures are not particularly
contagious because policyholders usually only have a right to
demand payment on the occurrence of a contractually specified
event.212 This minimizes the risk of a “run” on an insurer.213
208. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL
THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 92–93 (1986); cf. Regina Austin, The Insurance
Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 538–46 (1983) (describing
the utility of age, sex, and marital data to insurance companies’ calculation of
risk).
209. See generally BAKER, supra note 138, at 25.
210. See Henderson, supra note 20, at 2–4.
211. See Richard Herring & Til Schuermann, Capital Regulation for Position Risk in Banks, Securities Firms, and Insurance Companies, in CAPITAL
ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL: BANKING, SECURITIES, AND INSURANCE 23–24 (Hal
S. Scott ed., 2005); Klein, Overview, supra note 5, at 28 (“With the exception of
the problems suffered by the American International Group . . . and financial
guaranty insurers, it is not clear that the insurance industry poses the kind of
systemic risk to other markets as that posed by banks or other financial institutions.”); VAUGHAN, supra note 24, at 3 (“The insurance industry is more likely to be the recipient of systemic risk from other economic agents rather than
the driving force that creates systemic risk.”).
212. Life insurers are more susceptible to contagion because life insurance
products often include savings vehicles from which policyholders can withdraw
funds. See JERRY, supra note 2, at 31. Even for life insurance products, contagious risks are limited because the most common forms of life insurance—term
life insurance and basic annuities—do not permit policyholders to withdraw
funds. Id. at 30. Perhaps more importantly, policyholders conceptualize life
insurance products differently than they conceptualize demand deposits in
banks. History bears these distinctions out: there has never been a run on the
life insurance industry, despite occasional predictions of such runs in the popular press. See Scott E. Harrington, Policyholder Runs, Life Insurance Company Failures, and Insurance Solvency Regulation, 15 REG. 27, 30 (1992); cf.
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Second, unlike credit, the availability and proper functioning of
insurance is not a prerequisite to most systemically important
economic activities.214 To the extent that insurance unavailability did pose systemic concerns, ex post government intervention
could relatively easily fix the problem by temporarily reinsuring the risk, or providing the insurance directly.215 Finally, the
inability of an insurer to pay claims is unlikely to be systemically significant as insurers naturally avoid concentrated and
correlated risks. While insurance regulation may be less concerned with protecting third parties than banking regulation,
such protection is nonetheless an important goal of insurance
regulation. Yet, it is a goal that insurers’ demand for competing
regulators would ignore.

Regulatory Modernization: Perspectives on Insurance Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of Martin F. Grace). Even the near collapse of insurance giant AIG has
not triggered an “insurance run” from AIG itself or from other insurers. See
Editorial, The Never-Ending Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at A26.
213. In banking, contagion is triggered by depositors who fear that their
bank may be financially weak and therefore choose to withdraw their deposits.
This can devastate even healthy banks. It can also promote contagion, as depositors at other banks seek to withdraw funds for fear that their own bank is
financially weak. See DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS
THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER 91 (2002). Banking regulation limits this risk
by providing deposit insurance, which limits the incentives of wary depositors
to withdraw their funds. Id. at 118.
214. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate
Governance: The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795,
1834, 1841 (2007) (suggesting that the purchase of traditional forms of insurance by these companies is somewhat of a mystery, at least when they are
publicly owned); Victor P. Goldberg, The Devil Made Me Do It: The Corporate
Purchase of Insurance 2 (Columbia Law Sch., Working Paper No. 346, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1338336. Thus, while many decried an
insurance crisis in the mid-1980s, when many forms of insurance suddenly became unavailable, this crisis hardly ravaged the national or world economies.
See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
YALE L.J. 1521, 1522 (1987). To the extent there was any systemic impact, it
was on certain classes of individuals, such as doctors unable to find medical
malpractice insurance, rather than on systemically important entities. See id.
at 1526.
215. There is ample precedent for such measures, most notably the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 103, 116 Stat. 2327
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6701 (2006 & Supp. 2007)). Such a program would not need to be long term because the availability of insurance is
characterized not by precipitous and self-reinforcing shocks in availability (as
in banking), but rather by natural cycles of availability. Insurance markets
routinely cycle between “hard” markets, where coverage is limited and more
expensive, and “soft markets,” where it is comparatively available and inexpensive.
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III. REGULATORY SUPPLY AND INSURANCE
Part II argued that insurers in a scheme of regulatory
competition would demand minimalist regulatory regimes that
imposed as few costs and constraints on them as possible. But
competing regulators would not necessarily supply such a regime. Simply put, competing regulators would have various incentives other than attracting insurers to their regime. These
include generating good publicity, currying favor from political
and industry interests, avoiding public scandals and, of course,
following through on their stated regulatory objectives.
The degree to which “ordinary” political economy factors
would temper insurers’ demand for deregulation depends crucially on the number of competing regulators. As the number of
competing regulators increases, so too will the prospect that
regulatory demand will dominate other regulatory incentives.216 Consequently, while regulatory demand would largely
determine outcomes in an SLS scheme with fifty competing
regulators, it would simply supplement other regulatory incentives in an OFC scheme that contained only two competing
regulators.
This distinction is crucial, as a limited incentive for regulators to attract competing firms may, in certain contexts, offset
some of the inefficiencies of regulation without jeopardizing its
core objectives. This argument is often deployed by defenders of
the dual banking system.217 In particular, they have argued
that the dual banking system causes regulators to reduce regulatory costs, embrace innovation, and specialize in different
types of banks.218 At the same time, the dual banking system
does not undermine the effectiveness of regulation, according to
its defenders, because regulators must balance their desire to
attract banks with the political consequences of allowing banks
to fail.219
This Part evaluates these arguments in the insurance context, looking at the extent to which limited regulatory competition, such as that envisioned in the OFC, could improve the
content of insurance regulation. It focuses on three ways in
which regulatory demand for decreased regulatory costs may
theoretically do so. First, section A considers the argument that
216.
217.
218.
219.

See supra text accompanying note 125.
See Fischel et al., supra note 94, at 335.
See Miller, supra note 61, at 14 –15.
See supra Part I.B.3.
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the political economy of insurance regulation means that it is
naturally prone to excessive intervention in the markets. If so,
limited regulatory competition may provide a desirable counterweight to this tendency. Focusing on nonsolvency consumer
protections—the domain most frequently criticized on these
grounds220—it argues that insurance regulation is structurally
more susceptible to the opposite problem: insufficient regulation. Regulatory competition would exacerbate this problem rather than offset it.
Section B turns to a second regulatory supply argument:
that regulatory demand can promote more efficient regulation
without jeopardizing regulatory effectiveness. Here, the primary target of critics is typically state solvency regulation, at least
once one sets aside complaints about the duplicative and overlapping nature of nonsolvency regulation for multistate insurers.221 While acknowledging that insurance solvency regulation
is indeed antiquated, section B argues that regulatory competition is not a good solution to this problem. Rather, it would undermine the most promising approach to modernizing solvency
regulation and jeopardize a scheme that worked reasonably
well in the recent financial crisis.
Finally, section C considers the argument that regulatory
competition can promote specialization among different regulators. It argues that the status quo already achieves such regulatory specialization through cooperation rather than competition. It also observes that, at least in the property/casualty
context, the most important form of specialization for regulators—familiarity with local perils and the state tort system—is
embedded in the status quo.
A. REGULATORY COMPETITION AND OFFSETTING EXCESSIVE
REGULATION
Regulatory competition is often defended on supply-side
grounds based on the claim that monopolistic regulatory
schemes tend to be excessive. Regulatory competition, from this
220. Few commentators argue that state solvency regulation is excessive,
as most seem to accept the premise that such regulation is sensible, even if it
could be more efficiently conducted.
221. Efficiency complaints about nonsolvency regulations usually involve
the difficulty of complying with multiple regulatory regimes rather than the
substantive inefficiencies associated with any particular regulatory approach.
As noted at the outset, this Article explicitly excludes this issue from analysis
on the grounds that regulatory competition is not necessary to address this
problem.
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perspective, can offset this natural tendency of regulation. At
the very least, it can give regulated entities a safety valve
against the worst regulatory excesses. Moreover, regulators’
natural inclination to overregulate mitigates the prospect that
a small number of competing regulators would go too far in
promoting deregulation to attract regulated entities.222
Such supply-side arguments are common among proponents of insurance regulatory reform, who often cite price regulation in homeowners and automobile insurance markets to argue that political forces promote excessive state regulation of
insurers’ market behavior.223 And a fair reading of the evidence
supports these claims. Both automobile and homeowners insurance premiums are highly salient political issues in certain
states.224 This political pressure has often generated regulatory
efforts to prohibit or limit price increases in insurance markets.225 Yet most economic studies of insurance markets conclude that such price regulation results in premiums artificially
cycling between low and high levels without decreasing consumer costs in the long term.226 The reason is that automobile
and homeowners insurance markets are naturally quite price
competitive,227 meaning that artificially low prices must be off222. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing these arguments in the banking context).
223. See, e.g., Grace & Scott, supra note 7, at 74; Klein, Overview, supra
note 5, at 31; Robert E. Litan & Phil O’Connor, Consumer Benefits of an Optional Federal Charter: The Case of Auto Insurance, in THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 4, at 145–46; cf. Butler
& Ribstein, supra note 4, at 38 (“[S]tates . . . [have] the ability and incentive to
impose inefficient regulation at the behest of local interest groups.”).
224. See generally Cummins, supra note 148, at 10–11 (“[A]uto insurance
prices have been a potent political issue in legislative and gubernatorial elections for decades in states such as New Jersey and Massachusetts.”); Grace &
Klein, supra note 38, at 105 (“The cost and availability of property insurance
has been a potent issue in many coastal areas, none more so than Florida.”).
225. See Cummins, supra note 148, at 13; Grace & Klein, supra note 38, at
105. This is hardly surprising, as state insurance commissioners are either
elected or appointed by the state governor, and thus operate in a highly politicized environment. See Martin F. Grace & Richard D. Phillips, Regulator Performance, Regulatory Environment and Outcomes: An Examination of Insurance Regulator Career Incentives on State Insurance Markets, 32 J. BANKING &
FIN. 116, 121 (2008).
226. See Stephen D’Arcy, Insurance Price Deregulation: The Illinois Experience, in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra note 38, at
248, 265–66; Scott E. Harrington, Effects of Prior Approval Rate Regulation of
Auto Insurance, in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE supra
note 38, at 285, 309.
227. See Harrington, supra note 226, at 309–10.
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set by artificially high prices or else insurers will simply refuse
to write coverage in the state.228 This pattern not only results
in artificially large price changes and volatility in the availability of coverage, but it also promotes moral hazard and adverse
selection.229
Although some states’ price regulations are indeed excessive, state market conduct regulation—defined here to include
price and form regulation230—is actually dominated by problems of precisely the opposite character. In part, this is because
the character of price regulation has changed across the country in the last decade. Only fifteen states currently require insurers’ pricing schemes to be approved before they are offered
in the marketplace and no state unilaterally sets insurance
rates.231 With a few notable exceptions (such as Florida), these
states are increasingly abandoning efforts to use price regulation as a tool to keep premiums below market rates.232 Rather,

228. This is particularly evident in Florida, where homeowners must increasingly purchase their coverage from a state-run insurer because so many
private insurers refuse to operate in that market. See Grace & Klein, supra
note 38, at 90. Recently, State Farm threatened to leave the Florida market,
and agreed to stay only after the state regulator allowed it to nonrenew up to
fifteen percent of its residential property policies and to raise its insurance
rates on approximately fifteen percent on all homeowners and condominium
unit owners policies. See Lavonne Kuykendall, Insurer State Farm Drops Plan
to Leave Florida, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT
-CO-20091216-712292.html.
229. See Harrington, supra note 226, at 310; Sharon Tennyson, Efficiency
Consequences of Rate Regulation in Insurance Markets 18 (Networks Fin.
Inst., Policy Brief No. 2007-PB-03, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=985578 (suggesting attempts to regulate insurance prices may be “self-defeating in the long run”).
230. Market conduct regulation is sometimes distinguished from the regulation of insurance policy forms and rates. The former is envisioned to encompass only issues such as insurers’ advertising, selling, and claims handling.
This Article collapses this distinction for expositional ease.
231. See J. ROBERT HUNTER, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., STATE AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE REGULATION: A NATIONAL QUALITY ASSESSMENT AND IN-DEPTH
REVIEW OF CALIFORNIA’S UNIQUELY EFFECTIVE REGULATORY SYSTEM 2–3
(2008), http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/finance/
state_auto_insurance_report.pdf (reporting that fifteen states use prior approval, twenty-three states employ file and use, eight states employ use and
file, and four have limited regulatory oversight). In contrast, in January 2001,
thirty-one states required prior approval of automobile insurance rates. Cummins, supra note 148, at 3.
232. See, e.g., Phil Gusman, Mass. AG, Insurers Spar Over State’s Auto Insurance System, NAT’L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY, Dec. 28, 2009, http://
www.property-casualty.com/News/2009/12/Pages/Mass-AG-Insurers-Spar-Over
-States-Auto-Insurance-System.aspx (describing Massachusetts’ abandonment
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they are tending to focus their scrutiny on the more defensible
goal of ensuring that rates do not discriminate among policyholders based on illegitimate criteria.233
Even more importantly, insurance market conduct regulation outside of price regulation is generally subject to political
forces that lead to underregulation rather than overregulation.
In contrast to price regulation, most forms of market conduct
regulation only matter to consumers who actually use their insurance. Examples include regulations governing the qualifications and duties of insurance agents, the accuracy and effectiveness of disclosures, the substance of insurance policies, and
the willingness of insurers to settle claims promptly and fairly.234 Because most policyholders never suffer substantial
losses, they generally have no first-hand experience with these
regulatory issues.235 And when consumers do experience losses,
and potentially encounter market conduct regulatory issues,
those experiences are normally discrete and non-correlated.236
Not only are most forms of market conduct regulation unfamiliar to consumers, they are also quite complex. Unlike with
premiums, an appreciation of the contractual and regulatory
rules governing insurers and their sales force is generally necessary to understand these issues.
Because the vast majority of market conduct regulations
are complex and nonsalient, they are more prone to regulatory
capture and underregulation than the excesses that have characterized price regulation in the recent past. The leading study
of the political economy of insurance regulation concluded that
of the system of setting insurance “rates that would be used by all auto insurers”).
233. See infra text accompanying notes 244–57.
234. See generally ROBERT W. KLEIN, A REGULATOR’S INTRODUCTION TO
THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 107–13, 140–67 (2d ed. 2005) (providing an overview of the elements of market conduct regulation).
235. See Schwarcz, supra note 115, at 1414 (“Unlike virtually any other
product, the most important element of insurance policies—the protection they
provide against low-probability, high-cost losses—is also an element that only
a few insureds actually use or experience.”).
236. This is not an accident. Insurance is specifically designed to aggregate
an individual’s risks of loss so that the risks occur in predictable and steady
fashion. See BAKER, supra note 138, at 2. The obvious exception involves mass
catastrophes, where insurance regulatory issues can become quite politically
salient precisely because numerous policyholders simultaneously experience a
sizeable and publicly accessible loss. Insurance regulators may tend to be less
captured by industry interests in such scenarios. Elizabeth Baker Murrill,
Mass Disaster Mediation: Innovative ADR, or a Lion’s Den?, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 401, 403–07 (2007).
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industry interests historically dominated debates about regulatory issues at the state level when those issues were complex
and not politically salient.237 Perhaps the most notorious example is the institutionalization of semiprivate rate-making organizations that facilitated price fixing among competing property/casualty insurers.238 When insurance issues are not
politically salient, political forces are relatively weak but industry interests can be quite strong, especially when the industry
is relatively unified in its position. This is hardly surprising, as
state insurance regulators interact constantly with industry
representatives.239 Even more importantly, there is also a sig237. Randall, supra note 1, at 679; see also MEIER, supra note 38 (“The political economy of insurance regulation results from a complex interaction of
insurance groups, consumer interests, regulatory bureaucrats, and political
elites.”).
238. Meier’s excellent book reviews a number of examples of this phenomenon in depth. See generally MEIER, supra note 38. Consider two of the most
important examples. First, the Armstrong Committee of 1906 was formed by
the New York legislature in the wake of massive publicity concerning the
extravagant lifestyles of insurance industry executives. Id. at 58–59. The
Committee uncovered substantial abuses in the life insurance industry, leading to comprehensive reform of the life insurance business. By contrast, the
Merritt Committee was formed around the same time in response to the San
Francisco earthquake, which bankrupted several property/casualty insurance
companies. Id. at 59–61. Unlike the Armstrong Committee, insurers were able
to control the agenda of the Merritt Committee in order to develop a scheme of
collaborative ratemaking that ultimately created a state-run system for fixing
fire insurance premiums. See id. at 57–64. Meier concludes that property/casualty insurers fared better than life insurers because “the Merritt Committee asked reasons why fire insurance companies failed and the Armstrong
Committee addressed political and economic abuses by the life insurance industry. The former, dealing with adequate rates and other technical issues, is
more complex than the latter. The insurance industry was able to improve its
position with the Merritt Committee because it was able to control information
in a complex area.” Id. at 84 –85. Second, consider the fact that the property/casualty industry operated largely under a state-sponsored cartel during
the first half of the twentieth century. Insurance rates were set by industry
rate bureaus, which were minimally regulated. Such regulation permitted specified levels of underwriting profits, and excluded any investment income in
calculating these profits, even though investing the float on insurance premiums is a substantial portion of the insurance business model. Id. at 64. It
was only when antitrust charges were brought against the insurance industry,
resulting in the Supreme Court case Southeastern Underwriters that this
model changed. Prior to that politically salient event, “thirty five states filed
briefs opposing the Justice Department’s” position that insurance was commerce that was subject to the authority of the federal government, suggesting
that “the dominant partner in the symbiotic relationship between state regulators and the insurance companies was the insurance companies.” Id. at 66.
239. See Randall, supra note 1, at 677–82 (discussing interactions between
industry representatives and regulators at NAIC meetings).
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nificant amount of cross-fertilization between the industry and
top state regulators, with seventeen percent of state insurance
commissioners employed in the insurance industry before becoming commissioners, and fifty percent of commissioners
going directly to insurance industry positions after their tenure
as commissioners.240
This trend is evident in some of the most important market
conduct issues of the last decade. First, industry interests have
dominated debates about the public release of company-specific
information. For years, consumer advocates have sought the release of data about individual insurers’ market conduct practices, such as how often claims were paid within specified time
periods, how often claims were denied, how often policyholders
sued, and how often policies were canceled or nonrenewed.241
Such information, while absolutely necessary to assess the relative quality of different insurance options, is almost entirely
absent from the public domain.242 In 2008, under the leadership
of a pro-consumer state insurance commissioner, the Market
Conduct and Consumer Affairs Committee of the NAIC proposed publicly disclosing this data. Organizing through the
American Council of Life Insurers, the American Insurance Association, the National Association of Mutual Insurers, and the
Property Casualty Insurers of North America, the industry successfully defeated the proposal through a massive lobbying
campaign.243
Second, industry interests have generally prevailed with
respect to the use of credit scoring in insurance, which consumer groups have consistently attacked over the last decade.244
The vast majority of automobile and homeowners insurers use
240. Grace & Phillips, supra note 225, at 122 tbl.1.
241. See James Connolly, NAIC Insurer Conduct Data Scheme Riles Insurers, NAT’L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www
.property-casualty.com/News/2008/9/Pages/NAIC-Insurer-Conduct-Data-Scheme
-Riles-Insurers.aspx; Letter from Lawrence Mirel to Sandy Praeger, President
of the Nat’l Assoc. of Ins. Comm’rs (Apr. 16, 2008) (on file with author). Unfortunately, insurers have bitterly resisted the proposal under the guise of confidentiality and trade secrets. See infra text accompanying notes 307–09.
242. See Schwarcz, supra note 138, at 734.
243. See supra note 241.
244. See, e.g., CHI CHI WU, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. & BIRNY BIRNBAUM, CTR. FOR ECON. JUSTICE, CREDIT SCORING AND INSURANCE: COSTING
CONSUMERS BILLIONS AND PERPETUATING THE ECONOMIC RACIAL DIVIDE 1,
18 (2007), available at http://www.consumerlaw.org/reports/content/Insurance
Scoring.pdf (calling for a ban on the use of credit scoring in insurance, but noting that many states permit it).
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policyholders’ credit scores to price their policies.245 This is not
surprising, given that there is substantial evidence that individuals’ credit scores correspond to their losses.246 However, it
is still unclear why this is the case—there is limited reason to
expect that consumers’ likelihood of paying back loans would
predict their likelihood of suffering an insurance loss.247 This is
significant because insurers have long been prohibited from relying on certain underwriting factors even though they may be
predictive of losses, such as race and home value.248 Yet credit
scores serve as strong proxies for these characteristics.249
Third, the insurance industry has dominated state insurance regulators’ responses to insurance intermediaries’ compensation arrangements. In 2004, the New York Attorney General sued several prominent insurance brokers for accepting
kickbacks from insurers to whom they steered business.250 Although the lawsuit resulted in the leading insurance brokers
abandoning this practice, state insurance regulators have done
virtually nothing to address the larger issues that the lawsuits
identified, particularly in consumer insurance markets.251 No
state has passed any substantive regulations of agents’ commission arrangements, and the disclosure regulations that do
exist are extremely limited.252 New York’s recent efforts to develop more extensive disclosure requirements prompted extensive industry outcry, causing New York to limit the scope of the
required disclosures.253
245. See id. at 4.
246. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, CREDIT-BASED INSURANCE SCORES: IMPACTS
ON CONSUMERS OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 3 (2007), available at http://www
.ftc.gov/os/2007/07/P044804FACTA_Report_Credit-Based_Insurance_Scores.pdf.
247. See id. (reporting that “there is not sufficient evidence to judge” why
the correlation exists).
248. See id. at 61 (“The risk models that companies build do not include
information about race, ethnicity, or income. If there are large differences in
average risk based on [those factors], then models may attribute some of those
differences in risk to other variables included in the model . . . .”). See generally Austin, supra note 208, at 528 (discussing legislative restrictions on factors
insurers may consider).
249. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 246, at 72–73 (finding a “proxy
effect” between credit scores and race).
250. Schwarcz, supra note 169, at 290.
251. See id. at 291; see also Robert W. Cooper, Spitzer’s Allegations of the
Anticompetitive Effects of Contingent Commissions: A Shot Truly Heard
Around the World, J. INS. REG., Fall 2007, at 83, 100 (detailing American regulatory responses to industry problems with conflicts of interest).
252. See Schwarcz, supra note 169, at 292.
253. See Phil Gusman, IIABNY Threatens Suit Over N.Y. Producer Comp Rule,
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In sum, the available evidence simply does not suggest that
insurance market conduct regulation as a whole can accurately
be characterized as excessive. To be sure, state insurance regulation is occasionally quite aggressive, particularly when it
comes to rate regulations. Moreover, strong consumer advocates do occasionally come into power in particular states and
implement more far-reaching consumer protection programs.254
But in the aggregate, ordinary “monopolistic” insurance regulation is more frequently subject to substantial regulatory capture that produces underregulation as opposed to excessive
regulation. Trying to address this problem by embracing even a
limited form of regulatory competition, such as that embodied
in the OFC, would exacerbate this problem rather than solve it.
B. REGULATORY COMPETITION AND IMPROVING REGULATORY
EFFICIENCY
A second key supply-side argument for regulatory competition is that it can promote more efficient regulation that reduces compliance costs for insurers but does not sacrifice effectiveness. In the insurance context, this argument is primarily
directed at solvency regulation.255 Indeed, the two key elements
of state solvency regulation—capital and reserve requirements256—have remained relatively static over the last two
NAT’L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY, Dec. 3, 2009, http://www.property
-casualty.com/News/2009/12/Pages/IIABNY-Threatens-Suit-Over-NY-Producer
-Comp-Rule.aspx; Mark E. Ruquet, N.Y. Compensation Rules Would Burden
Them, Some Agents Say, NAT’L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY, Sept. 11,
2009, http://www.property-casualty.com/News/2009/9/Pages/NY-Compensation
-Rules-Would-Burden-Them-Some-Agents-Say.aspx.
254. Recent examples include J. Robert Hunter in Texas and John Garamendi in California. See, e.g., Linda Tuma, Hunter Refocuses Texas Ins. Dept.,
NAT’L UNDERWRITER, Mar. 21, 1994; Joseph B. Treaster, States Increase Their
Scrutiny of Insurance Brokers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2004, http://www.nytimes
.com/2004/10/21/business/21broker.htm (discussing Garamendi’s efforts as the
California Insurance Commissioner).
255. Once again, the primary efficiency argument with respect to market
conduct regulation is based on the need for multistate insurers to comply with
multiple regulatory schemes and is not addressed for that reason. See supra
note 221.
256. See generally KLEIN, supra note 234, at 140–64 (discussing capital
standards and reserve requirements and their use in solvency regulation). Of
course, solvency regulation encompasses various additional elements. For instance, solvency regulations impose limits on the types of assets that insurers
can hold. See id. at 146. Additionally, they include less quantitative review of
insurer activity, such as scrutiny of insurers’ management. See id. at 161–62.
All solvency rules are enforced via quarterly and annual reports that insurers
must file with state regulators, as well as by regular examinations of insurers’
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decades, even though their shortcomings have become increasingly apparent during that time.257
First, state regulators have done very little since the early
1990s to modernize their approach to setting capital requirements for insurers. Currently, insurers’ capital requirements
are primarily determined by a risk-based formula that attempts to measure insurers’ underwriting risk, asset risk, interest rate risk, and business risk.258 Various remedial measures are required when insurers fall below the requisite capital
measures dictated by the risk-based formula.259 In the last two
decades, though, the limits of this approach to setting capital
requirements have become increasingly clear. First, it does not
take into account substantial factors associated with insolvencies, including management risk and catastrophe risk.260
records to ensure the accuracy of more regular reports. See id. at 149–50. Insurers’ annual statements to regulators are completed according to statutory
accounting principles (SAP). Id. at 150. These are designed to be more conservative than generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). See id. at
150–51. In particular, both assets and liabilities are valued on a liquidation
basis, rather than a going-concern basis. Id. For an example of how SAP calculations work, see SEAN MOONEY & LARRY COHEN, BASIC CONCEPTS OF ACCOUNTING & TAXATION OF PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANIES 22–26
(1991).
257. The current state solvency regime was largely constructed in the early
1990s, when several highly visible insurance failures forced state regulators to
modernize their approach to insurance regulation. See Grace, supra note 41, at
10 (“[S]olvency regulation as practiced by the states and the NAIC has not
been scrutinized since Congress made them do so in the late 1980s and early
1990s.”).
258. There are actually three different models: one for life insurers, one for
property/casualty, and one for health. See Martin Eling & Ines Holzmüller, An
Overview and Comparison of Risk-Based Capital Standards, J. INS. REG.,
Summer 2008, at 31, 34. In order to be accredited by the NAIC, states are required to adopt the Risk-Based Capital for Insurers Model Act (RBC Model
Act), MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES: RISK-BASED CAPITAL
(RBC) FOR INSURERS MODEL ACT 312-1 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs. 2010), or
substantially similar provisions. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS., FINANCIAL
REGULATION STANDARDS AND ACCREDITATION PROGRAM 7 (2009), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_f_FRSA_pamphlet.pdf. The Act sets
insurers’ capital requirements by aggregating risk charges for an insurer’s assets, liabilities, and other risks into a number that represents the level of capital required to support ongoing operations. See Pottier & Sommer, supra note
131, at 104.
259. For instance, while insurers who fall below the first threshold must
file a remedial plan with regulators, insurers who fall below the last threshold
must be seized by insurance regulators. See Klein, supra note 258, at 31
tbl.IV.1.
260. See Eling & Holzmüller, supra note 258, at 55–56. This is striking given the significance of these two factors in most insurer insolvencies and the
fact that other countries do include these factors in risk-based capital models.
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Second, it assigns crude ratings to different assets and liabilities that only partially reflect the actual associated risks.261
Third, it does a poor job accounting for insurers’ diversification
and risk mitigation measures, employing a simple covariance
formula that does not credit standard hedging techniques,
much less sophisticated portfolio design.262
Reserve requirements, the second core element of insurance solvency regulation, have similarly evolved quite slowly
over the last twenty years, especially with respect to life insurance. Regulations require that insurers set aside dedicated reserves to pay for anticipated losses on their policies in the future.263 In the life insurance industry, regulators strictly
specify the criteria that insurers must use to predict those
losses.264 Yet life insurance products have evolved dramatically
in the last decade as life insurers have increasingly competed
with banks and securities firms to develop capital accumulation
products.265 Regulators’ formulaic rules for establishing reserves do not come close to keeping up with this rapid pace of
product development.266 Regulations governing reserves can
See Simon Ashby et al., Lessons About Risk: Analysing the Causal Chain of
Insurance Company Failure, J. INS. RES. & PRAC., July 2003, at 1, 4 –13.
261. See J. David Cummins et al., Insolvency Experience, Risk-Based Capital, and Prompt Corrective Action in Property-Liability Insurance, 19 J. BANKING & FIN. 511 passim (1995) (finding that the predictive accuracy of the RBC
formula for property-casualty companies is low, and proposing several modifications that could improve its accuracy); Scott Harrington, Capital Adequacy
in Insurance and Reinsurance, in BEYOND BASEL: BANKING, SECURITIES, AND
INSURANCE, supra note 211, at 104 –05 (noting that NAIC’s risk-based capital
standards are crude measures of real risk).
262. See Herring & Schuermann, supra note 211, at 30 (noting that rulesbased systems for setting capital standards “do not take into account the diversification benefits achieved through less than perfect correlation (the socalled portfolio effect)”); id. at 38 (describing ways in which the NAIC RBC approach does, and does not, take into account diversification).
263. See Larry Bruning, Principles-Based Reserving: A Regulator’s Perspective, J. INS. REG., Spring 2006, at 3, 3–4.
264. See id. at 4.
265. See Brown, supra note 23, at 8 (“Both consumers and regulators find it
increasingly difficult to discern meaningful differences among insurance,
banking and securities products.”); Peter J. Wallison, Convergence in Financial Services Markets: Effects on Insurance Regulation, in THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 4, at 167, 179 (“Insurers have developed tools and products that are increasingly substitutes for
capital market instruments.”).
266. See Bruning, supra note 263, at 4 (noting regulators’ concern that “the
current system does not adequately account for the new risks”); Wallison, supra note 265, at 172–73 (discussing institutional resistance to regulatory
change).
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consequently be both over- and under-inclusive: they sometimes damage life insurers’ capacity to compete with other financial services firms by requiring excessive reserves, and they
sometimes create large insolvency risk by requiring inadequate
reserves.267
Embracing an OFC or other scheme of limited regulatory
competition is one plausible approach to inducing more rapid
modernization of solvency regulation. A key benefit of regulatory competition is that it tends to improve regulators’ responsiveness to industry needs and incentives to embrace innovation.268 An OFC, for instance, might well prompt state and
federal regulators to more quickly develop appropriate solvency
requirements for new products, as failing to do so could mean
losing the business of insurers. Similarly, it might prompt competing federal and state regulators to develop more sophisticated tools for setting capital requirements that take into account the diversification of insurers’ portfolios and their
exposure to catastrophe and operational risk.
Enhanced regulatory competition nonetheless does not
represent an attractive option for improving state solvency regulation. The key reason is that it is incompatible with the most
promising substantive approach to improving solvency regulation: shifting towards a more principles-based solvency paradigm.269 Principles-based solvency regulation deemphasizes,
267. See Bruning, supra note 263, at 4 (contrasting regulators’ fears of excessive risk with insurers’ desire to compete with other financial services providers on the basis of their own risk management processes); Wallison, supra
note 265, at 183 (describing the difficulty of striking the right balance of regulatory oversight and vigorous industry competition).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 216–19.
269. Lawrence Cunningham takes issue with the notion that regulatory
schemes can be, or ought to be, designated principles-based or rules-based.
Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principlesbased Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60
VAND. L. REV. 1411 passim (2007). Cunningham’s basic argument is that regulatory systems usually use both rules and standards, meaning that it is not
desirable to cabin regulatory schemes in one category or the other. See id. This
Article does not necessarily take issue with this claim, arguing only that insurance regulation can be substantially improved by incorporating more standards than exist in the status quo, and then carefully working to hold insurers
accountable for pursuing those standards. See, e.g., Kenneth Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation, 56 DUKE L. J. 377 (2006) (discussing costs and benefits
of this form of regulation). Increased usage of standards does not mean, and
should not mean, that rules-based approaches should not also be employed
when they would prove effective. See Therese M. Vaughan, The Implications of
Solvency II for U.S. Insurance Regulation, passim (Networks Fin. Inst., Pol’y
Brief No. 2009-PB-03, 2009), available at http://www.naic.org/Releases/2009_
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but does not eliminate, reliance on prescribed formulas and requirements designed to measure firms’ financial health, such
as capital requirements and mandatory reserves.270 It supplements such bright-line rules with more flexible and firmspecific risk-management strategies, often attempting to enlist
firms in developing these approaches.
Increased usage of principles-based regulation has numerous potential benefits: it harnesses the experience and sophistication of firms; it allows regulation to more easily keep up with
innovation; it is sufficiently flexible to encourage, and account
for, risk diversification; and it may promote internal forces
within insurers to manage risk more effectively.271 In recognition of these benefits, state insurance regulation has gradually
been moving towards a principles-based approach to solvency
regulation over the last several years.272 Moreover, enhanced
principle-based regulation is an important element of international efforts to modernize solvency regulation, including Solvency II (European Union) and the Insurance Core Principles
docs/090305_vaughan_presentation.pdf (advocating for a principles-based approach that is backstopped by a more rules-based approach).
270. See Vaughan, supra note 269, at 11–12 (contrasting American regulations with proposed European reforms). Unlike American regulators, insurance regulators in the European Union are on the cusp of embracing this more
fluid approach to determining capital requirements, in a project known as Solvency II. See id. at 2.
271. See Herring & Schuermann, supra note 211, at 30, 33 (permitting the
supervised use of internal models is “an implicit recognition of the complexity
and the fast pace of innovation in financial instruments and institutions,
where any rule written to set capital charges for a given set of instruments
may spur innovations to reduce or avoid the charge. Only an internal models
approach is likely to be able to address the portfolio of risks comprehensively
and dynamically”); Vaughan, supra note 269, at 4 –6.
272. First, the NAIC has just recently sought input from the NAIC membership on criteria for a statistical agent to collect firms’ principles-based reserve data, and has promulgated a corporate governance guide for firms utilizing principle-based reserves. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, PRINCIPLESBASED RESERVING WORKING GROUP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDANCE
FOR PRINCIPLES-BASED RESERVES (2009), available at http://www.naic.org/
documents/committees_ex_isftf_pbr_wg_corporate_governance_guide_pbr.pdf;
Principles-Based Reserving (EX) Working Group, http://www.naic.org/
committees_ex_isftf_pbr_wg.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010). Among its goals
for 2010, the NAIC intends to evaluate necessary changes to state laws to effectuate a principles-based regulatory framework. See Principle-Based Reserving (EX) Working Group, supra. Second, state insurance regulators have slowly introduced a principles-based approach into their risk-based capital
requirements. For instance, the NAIC has implemented limited programs to
rely on internal models for assessing interest rate risk on fixed annuities in
2000, and variable annuities in 2005. Vaughan, supra note 269, at 7.
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(International Association of Insurance Supervisors).273 A similar movement towards principles-based regulation is a fundamental component of international reform in banking regulation, although the desirability of such reform is substantially
more controversial in that context than in insurance given the
major systemic risks associated with banking.274
The key role of regulators in a principles-based solvency
scheme is to hold insurers accountable for effectively implementing regulatory principles.275 In order to realize the benefits
of principles-based regulation, regulators must effectively “regulate the exercise of [insurers’] judgment.”276 There is no
273. See Brown, supra note 3, at 963–72 (discussing in detail the Insurance
Core Principles and Solvency II).
274. See id. at 964 –65. Basel II has been subject to extensive criticism, especially in the wake of the financial crisis. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127, 133–41 (2009) (discussing criticisms
against Basel II’s operational risk provisions); Marketplace: Banks Brace for
Basel II (American Public Media radio broadcast July 2, 2008), available at
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2008/07/02/basel_ii/. But the case
for principles-based solvency regulation in insurance is much stronger than
the case for using such an approach in banking, as banking implicates various
systemic risks that are largely absent in the insurance arena. See supra text
accompanying notes 85–86, 132. Moreover, it is possible that insurance regulators would have an easier time assessing the adequacy of internal models
than banking regulators as many of the most important elements, such as underwriting risk, are within the core competencies of insurance regulators. See
KLEIN, supra note 234, at 119 (describing risk governance as one of the basic
responsibilities of insurance regulators).
275. A second, related, drawback of a principles-oriented regulatory
scheme is that it creates an increased risk of regulatory forbearance. As firms
find themselves in financial trouble, regulators may have strong incentives to
defer aggressive intervention in the hopes that the firm’s prospects will turn
around. Such forbearance can substantially exacerbate the ultimate costs of
financial failure. See Martin F. Grace et al., Insurance Company Failures: Why
Do They Cost So Much? 23 (Ctr. for Risk Mgmt. & Ins. Research, Ga. State
Univ., Working Paper No. 03-1, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=463103 (finding evidence of regulatory forbearance in
insurance); Therese M. Vaughan, The Implications of Prompt Corrective Action
for Insurance Firms 4 –6 (Networks Fin. Inst., Pol’y Brief No. 2008-PB-02,
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1099426
(discussing reasons for and consequences of regulatory forbearance).
276. Bamberger, supra note 269, at 381; Saule Omarova, Rethinking the
Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial Industry, BROOK. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming). By contrast, the rules-based regulations of capital and reserve requirements are largely formulaic, mitigating the need for regulators to rely on
the judgment of individual insurers and thus the risk that they will be misled
by the wrong-headed or disingenuous exercise of that judgment. See Bruning,
supra note 263, at 4 (noting that a rules-based approach to setting reserves
has the benefit of “clarity and specificity,” meaning that “regulators have a
good understanding of just how . . . reserves [are] calculated” by insurers); El-
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doubt that this is a difficult task, as firms have substantially
more expertise, knowledge, and resources than regulators, potentially allowing them to successfully defend patently insufficient risk-management safeguards.277 However, a burgeoning
field of academic literature explores various mechanisms
through which regulators can improve the accountability of
firms to meaningfully exercise their judgment as to the best
way to accomplish regulatory ends.278 A particularly important
way in which regulators can accomplish this is by cultivating
their capacity to participate in the development of firms’ internal efforts at regulatory compliance.279 Although firms will
clearly have substantially greater expertise regarding their
own risks, regulators can bring to the table a different type of
expertise developed from interacting with multiple firms over
time.280 They also can bring a different orientation that is not
embedded within the firm’s assumptions and culture.281

ing & Holzmüller, supra note 258, at 54 (“The U.S. system [of RBC] has relatively strict rules with clear sanctions . . . .”); id. at 53 (noting that a solvency
scheme that permits insurers to use internal models to set capital levels
means that regulators need more resources to review different sophisticated
models); Vaughan, supra note 269, at 16 (regulators must “understand how
. . . risks are modeled and . . . make judgments as to whether they are modeled
adequately” to effectively implement principles-based regulation).
277. See Vaughan, supra note 269, at 16 n.22 (“[R]egulatory capture
is . . . much more subtle and sophisticated than in the past. It’s not about bribery and corruption of officials. . . . It’s about big business persuading regulators about certain principles that seem eminently reasonable, although on further examination I believe are hollow and bankrupt; principles that the
regulators grab hold of and believe are right, but actually ultimately support
big businesses and the regulated.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
278. For a very good review of these mechanisms, see Bamberger, supra
note 269, at 436–68. See generally Saule Omarova, Wall Street as “Community
of Fate:” Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author) (arguing that industry self-regulation, properly incentivized, can effectively minimize systemic risk in the market).
279. See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 297–388 (1998) (describing the team-oriented makeup of the modern American firm and the ways in
which government can effectively interact with it); Bradley C. Karkkainen,
“New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 473–75 (2004) (discussing
a “new model of collaborative, multi-party, multi-level, adaptive, problemsolving New Governance”).
280. See Bamberger, supra note 269, at 464.
281. See id. at 444 –45 (discussing the ability of external interactions to
promote sound internal decision making in the firm).
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Regulatory competition undermines the capacity of regulators to hold firms accountable in these ways.282 First, regulatory
competition cripples regulators’ ability “to leverage enforcement
threats as a means to bargain for cooperative engagement” in
the development of firm-specific risk-management strategies.283
Simply put, regulators operating in a scheme of regulatory
competition would always need to worry that enforcement
threats would trigger a regulatory switch. This would diminish
their ability to insist that they be treated as real partners in
the development of risk-mitigation measures. Second, regulatory competition would undermine the role of regulators as longterm partners of insurers by rendering that relationship temporally unstable. Because firms could, at any time, choose to
switch regulators, regulators would have less reason to invest
in developing firm-specific knowledge and cultivating relationships with “double agents” within insurers who could be
counted upon to safeguard regulatory objectives. Firms would
be less likely to fully treat individual regulators as partners in
this process for similar reasons: doing so in any meaningful
way would be costly and time-consuming, and if the regulator
insisted on such treatment the insurer would always have the
option to switch regulators.
For these reasons, if regulatory competition did promote
principles-based regulation, it would promote a version of it
that would inevitably resemble deregulation, as its critics often
assert. This prospect is particularly unattractive as, notwithstanding its obsolescence, the present system of solvency regulation appears to have been effective in the recent financial crisis. Virtually every major insurer has maintained its financial
health in the last several years.284 Although AIG imploded, re282. Regulatory competition might also increase the already-heightened
risk of regulatory forbearance, see supra note 275, if it increased regulators’
willingness to permit risky bet-the-company strategies. This seems likely, as
taking an aggressive approach to shutting down insurers on the brink of insolvency would decrease insurer demand for those regulators. It is perhaps for
this reason that banking regulation seeks to limit the risk of regulatory forbearance by eliminating regulatory competition with respect to the decision of
whether to shut down a bank, relying almost exclusively on a single agency—
the FDIC—to close a bank in financial distress. Despite such efforts, regulatory forbearance with respect to small banks seems to have played an important
role in the recent financial crisis. See Eric Dash, Pathology of a Crisis: At
Failed Banks, Fatal Levels of Untreated Risk-Taking, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2009, at B1.
283. Bamberger, supra note 269, at 465.
284. See Grace, supra note 41, at 1–2.
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quiring a massive federal bailout, it was actually AIG’s credit
default swap activities, rather than its insurance operations,
that drove AIG to the brink of collapse.285 To be sure, part of
the industry’s success is attributable to market discipline,
which encouraged insurers to maintain conservative portfolios
in order to safeguard their ratings.286 But solvency regulation’s
role in this success also cannot be easily dismissed, given that
market discipline seems to have been insufficient to deter firms
like AIG from adopting high-risk approaches and that executive compensation arrangements in the insurance industry are
quite similar to the arrangements that seem to have induced
excessive risk taking in other segments of the economy. Risk
aversion, which is a guiding principle of most forms of solvency
regulation, suggests that policymakers should be hesitant to
radically alter a system that is achieving its basic goals, even if
it may be doing so inefficiently.
The insurance sector has, so far, escaped serious problems resulting
from the financial crisis. Life insurers’ bond and equity portfolios are
now valued lower and there have been rating downgrades in the life
business. . . . Property-casualty (p-c) insurers as a group are also relatively immune from the crisis as most p-c contracts are short term in
nature and are less likely to become insolvent due to changes in their
investment portfolio’s value. . . . One can argue that the current state
based system did an excellent job of protecting insurers’ consumers
and, to some extent, their stockholders, especially when superficially
compared to the federal banking regulators.
Id.
285. Insurance regulators had no jurisdiction over these activities, as federal regulators pressured state insurance regulators to issue an opinion letter
in 2000 declaring that CDSs did not meet the definition of insurance. Hearing
to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S. Economy: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 110th Cong. 81 (2009) (statement of Eric Dinallo, Superintendent, New York State Insurance Department). In fact, AIG’s
primary strategy in seeking to pay back its bailout funds has been to sell off
its financially healthy insurance companies. Edmund L. Andrews, A.I.G. Says
Revamping Could Take 3 to 5 Years, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2009, at B4; see also
Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Brady Dennis, Credit Rating Woes Sent AIG Spiraling,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2009, at C1. A recent article raises the prospect that AIG’s
insurance operations are also on shaky financial ground. See Mary Williams
Walsh, After Rescue, New Weakness Seen at A.I.G, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2009,
at A1. The NAIC has asserted that the article contained “incomplete and misleading information” and that “the 71 state-regulated insurance entities within AIG are financially sound and are fully able to pay claims.” Press Release,
Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs., AIG: NAIC Focused on Fidelity to the Facts (July
31, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.naic
.org/Releases/2009_docs/aig_naic_focus_on_fidelity.htm.
286. See Harrington, supra note 261, at 104 (arguing that substantial market discipline exists, given that life insurers curtailed asset risks in the 1990’s
when problems arose, most insurers have very high RBC rations, and guarantees are limited in many states and in all states are not more than $300,000).
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C. REGULATORY COMPETITION AND SPECIALIZATION
Another potential supply-side defense of regulatory competition is that it allows different regulators to specialize in different types of regulated entities. Regulators may develop particular expertise when dealing with similar types of regulated
entities. Alternatively, regulatory competition may cause competing jurisdictions to invest their limited resources and energy
into developing substantive rules that are particularly relevant
to a subset of regulated entities.287 One particularly good example of regulatory specialization comes from the current insurance sphere, where Vermont has developed a sophisticated
and elaborate body of law to govern captive insurers.288 Because captive insurers (by definition) only provide coverage to
one entity, they can easily arrange to “sell” their coverage in
Vermont.289
This regulatory supply argument in favor of limited regulatory competition is plausible. For instance, it is possible that
federal regulators in an OFC scheme might specialize in working with large national insurers because they have particularized expertise relevant to the typical investment portfolios of
large insurers. Similarly, state regulators might specialize in
working on the particularized issues that face small insurers,
such as their potentially limited access to capital markets or

287. See supra Part I.B.2.
288. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-536, RISK
RETENTION GROUPS: COMMON REGULATORY STANDARDS AND GREATER MEMBER PROTECTIONS ARE NEEDED 2–3 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d05536.pdf. Captive insurers are subject to regulation only in their
state of domicile and are more loosely regulated than traditional insurers. Id.
Vermont dominates the market for captive insurers because its regulation of
captive insurers is liberal and well developed. See id. at 4 –6; Kelly CruzBrown et al., Recent Developments in Insurance Regulation, 44 TORT TRIAL &
INS. PRAC. L.J. 591, 620 (2009); Gordon A. Schaller & Scott A. Harshman, Use
of Captive Insurance Companies in Estate Planning, 33 ACTEC J. 252, 252–54
(2008) (providing background information on captive insurance companies,
and noting that the captive insurance market is worldwide and that most U.S.
corporations choose a domicile for the corporation with modern captive insurance statutes, including Vermont).
289. As firms can purchase insurance coverage in a state for property or
events in other states, firms can purchase insurance through captives in any
jurisdiction. See INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, ISSUES PAPER ON THE REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANIES 6–7 (2006),
available at http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/Issues_paper_on_regulation_and_
supervision_of_captive_insurance_companies.pdf (recounting the propagation
of captive insurance companies in legally attractive jurisdictions separate from
the headquarters of the insured firm).
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the difficulties they may face in developing exclusive distribution schemes.
At least relative to the status quo, however, this benefit of
regulatory competition is minimal. First, the status quo system
of insurance regulation already does a good job of marshalling
regulatory resources from across the different states to meet
the particularized needs of different insurers. For instance,
through the NAIC and National Conference of Insurance Legislatures (NCOIL), state regulators and legislatures, respectively, organize their collective experience and expertise to develop
specialized model laws and best practices.290 Individual states
are then free to incorporate the results of this resourceintensive process into their own laws and regulations. In many
ways, this cooperative system for developing substantive law
works better than a scheme of regulatory competition in enhancing specialization, because it allows regulatory experts
within different jurisdictions to collaborate in crafting appropriately narrowly tailored laws.291 Similarly, regulators from
different states are often able to develop expertise by relying on
a national web of resources, training materials, and guidance.292 This allows even small state departments to have individual staff members develop the specific expertise that they
need to handle the regulatory issues they face on a daily basis.
Second, at least in the property/casualty context, the most
important specialized expertise that regulators can possess
concerns the particularized risks that insurers face when operating in a specific state. That is because the business of property/casualty insurance is in many ways inherently local. Different geographic regions present different types of property
hazards and different states have vastly different tort systems.
The state-based system of insurance regulation naturally promotes this form of regulatory specialization.
IV. REGULATING REGULATORY MARKETS IN
INSURANCE
Part II suggests that regulatory competition in insurance
will create demand-side forces that promote inevitable deregulation. Part III argues that such deregulation, even in the po290. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 1, at 629–39; infra Part IV (discussing
the efforts of the NAIC to coordinate regulation among different states).
291. Cf. Esty & Geradin, supra note 17, at 40–46 (discussing the benefits of
cooperation among regulators).
292. See Vaughan, supra note 269, at 9–10.
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tentially mild form associated with OFC proposals, is neither
normatively desirable nor likely to enhance regulatory efficiency. Like all markets, though, regulatory markets can themselves be regulated in order to harness the benefits, but limit
the costs, of competition. In some cases, this regulation can operate on regulatory supply, limiting the ability of competing
regulators to deregulate beyond a certain point. For instance,
bank regulation removes particularly sensitive regulatory issues—such as reserve requirements—from the domain of competition altogether. In other cases, regulation of regulatory
markets can operate on regulatory demand, inducing firms to
choose effective regulators. This, for instance, is one justification for requiring firms to fund the costs of a guarantee fund. If
firms must pay for the costs of failed firms, then they will have
reason to demand effective regulators that prevent firms from
failing and that intervene quickly, before the costs of those failures can be compounded.
This Part considers these and other potential avenues for
“regulating” regulatory competition in insurance. Section A begins by focusing on two potential safeguards against the prospect that regulatory competition would promote excessive deregulation of insurers’ market conduct. First, it considers proposals
that would set minimum standards for all competing regulators, effectively limiting the domain over which competition
may legitimately occur. While acknowledging the possibility
that such safeguards might limit the risk of unbridled deregulation, it questions how reliably these minimum standards
would be enforced. Second, it examines a proposal that would
allow individual jurisdictions to opt-out of regulatory competition through legislative action. Finding that such an opt-out
would be largely illusory, section A argues that it would do little to constrain regulatory competition.
Section B turns to solvency regulation. In this domain, efforts to improve the results of regulatory competition generally
operate on the demand side of regulatory markets, seeking to
improve insurers’ incentives to select socially desirable regulators. Section B argues that such efforts are not likely to prove
effective. It shows that sustainable guarantee funds that would
counterbalance the risk of excessive solvency deregulation are
difficult to construct. It also explores a central problem with
proposals to require insurers to issue risk-linked securities as a
means of supplementing guarantee funds.
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A. MARKET CONDUCT SAFEGUARDS
1. Mandatory Minimum Standards
One potential approach to preventing regulatory competition from producing excessively lax laws is to create minimum
standards for all regulated firms, irrespective of their chosen
regulator. This strategy attempts to directly prevent regulatory
competition from devolving beyond a certain point. Congress is
currently considering this type of reform in the form of a new
Consumer Financial Products Agency (CFPA). The agency
would be empowered to set minimum standards for various
consumer financial products (excluding insurance), irrespective
of the companies involved in marketing and selling those products.293 It would thus set a regulatory floor that was relatively
immune to the deregulatory forces of regulatory competition in
the banking sphere.294
The key drawback of relying on minimum standards to
constrain regulatory competition is that those standards may
not be enforced.295 Because minimum standards are specifically
designed to constrain competing regulators’ discretion, they are
unlikely to prove effective in influencing those regulators’ actions unless they are backed up by some enforcement mechanism. In some contexts, this role is served by the prospect of
preemption: competing jurisdictions that fail to adhere to federally imposed regulatory safeguards run the risk of having
their power stripped from them by Congress.296
Although federally imposed minimum standards overlaid
on top of a scheme of regulatory competition would certainly
decrease the risk of deregulation, it is unclear how effectively
such minimum standards would be enforced in the insurance
293. See generally Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R.
1880, 111th Cong. (2009).
294. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 91, at 98–101.
295. Another potential problem with minimum market conduct standards
is that they may interfere with effective solvency regulation by individual
competing regulators. The design of life insurance products influences the
substance of appropriate solvency restrictions. See Regulatory Restructuring:
Enhancing Consumer Protection: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (Statement of Gary E. Hughes, Executive Vice
President & General Counsel, American Council of Life Insurers). A seemingly
benign market conduct standard might consequently interfere with effective
solvency regulation.
296. See Roe, supra note 33, at 624 (arguing that the threat of federal
preemption exerts a disciplining effect on competition among states with respect to corporate law); McDonnell, supra note 111, at 48.
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context. This is because many, if not most, consumer protections in insurance take the form of broad standards that leave
substantial discretion to those charged with their enforcement.297 Examples abound.298 Regulators must assess whether
the insurer refused to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation; attempted to make unreasonably low settlement offers; failed to approve or deny a claim within a reasonable time period after a proof of loss has been submitted; or
failed to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlement of
claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably
clear.299 They must determine whether premiums are “unfairly
discriminatory” and whether policy forms are “unreasonably
surprising or unfair.”300 And they must assess whether advertising or sales tactics are misleading or unsuitable.301
There are numerous reasons for the prominence of standards in insurance consumer protections. First, property/casualty insurance contracts are themselves riddled with
ambiguities and uncertainties.302 Not only does this leave a
substantial amount of discretion and indeterminacy to insurers
in applying the language, but it also leaves a substantial
amount of discretion to regulators in regulating that relationship.303 Second, insurance contracts are unique among financial
contracts in that their value is explicitly contingent on individual and specific circumstances of the purchaser.304 This makes
297. In other words, they tend to be standards more than rules. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 611 (1992).
298. To be sure, there are some counterexamples. For instance, some states
prohibit pre-dispute arbitration agreements, which is a pretty clear rule. See
Schwarcz, supra note 129, at 762–63. Similarly, there are some clear disclosure requirements. See Schwarcz, supra note 169, at 313.
299. NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS & GUIDELINES, VOL. VI, 900-1 UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT (2008).
300. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 12401 (West 2009); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/143 (2009) (prohibiting unfair policy forms); MINN. STAT. § 70A.04 (2009)
(prohibiting “excessive” premiums).
301. See, e.g., NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS & GUIDELINES, VOL. V,
§ 710-1 MASS MARKETING OF PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE MODEL
REGULATION (2008).
302. See ABRAHAM, supra note 208, at 174 (“[I]nsurance policies often are
not specific enough to make the rights and obligations of the parties during
the claims process crystal clear.”). See generally Clark C. Havighurst, Consumers Versus Managed Care: The New Class Actions, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS 8
(2001) (noting that health insurance policy language is broad and malleable).
303. Cf. KATHLEEN HEALD ETTLINGER ET AL., STATE INSURANCE REGULATION 103 (1995).
304. Jackson, supra note 184, at 330.
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setting formulaic rules more difficult. Third, insurance regulation relies much less heavily than other forms of regulation on
disclosure for a variety of reasons.305 Although standardized
disclosures are relatively easy to set formulaically, other types
of regulations—such as those prohibiting false statements, unsuitable sales, misleading advertising, discriminatory pricing,
and the like—are much harder to set precisely ex ante.
Even if competing regulators refuse to strictly enforce minimum standards, it is possible that other entities would do
so.306 But no other enforcement mechanism could reasonably
substitute for the enforcement efforts of insurance regulators.
First, enforcing most nonsolvency related insurance standards
requires expertise and knowledge. For instance, identifying unfair claims practices requires reviewing a tremendous amount
of data.307 Similarly, determining whether a policy form contains an unfair or surprising term requires experience reviewing similar such forms. Second, market conduct violations are
frequently—though certainly not always—case-specific, involvContingent liabilities differ from fixed-return deposits or interests in
investment pools in that the value of contingent liabilities cannot be
determined without reference to unrelated events. In other words, the
value of contingent liabilities does not depend on the performance of
the issuing intermediary’s assets or the terms of the investment contract itself. Fire and life insurance policies are classic examples of
contingent liabilities.

Id.
305. See id.
306. See The Proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency: Implications
for Consumers and the FTC: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (Testimony of Prentiss Cox, Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School).
Enforcement of consumer protection laws and rule-making for consumer protection are different activities that require different models
to be effective. Unified rule-making authority in an agency dedicated
to consumer protection goals presents an extraordinary opportunity to
reform the consumer finance system to ensure products and sales
practices that meet minimum standards of fairness for consumers.
Public enforcement, on the other hand, is best accomplished in an
open model; a system that allows multiple public entities the opportunity to gauge compliance.
Id.
307. See Letter from Birny Birnbaum, Executive Dir., Ctr. For Econ. Justice, to Timothy B. Mullen (July 1, 2008), available at http://www.naic.org/
documents/committees_d_saswg_CEJ_080701_comments.pdf (“[T]he foundation for market analysis is data. Without meaningful data to analyze, market
analysis is, at best, a limited exercise. . . .”). This data includes extensive selfreporting from insurers themselves, complaint data from consumers, and selfgenerated data from market conduct exams. See generally NAIC, MARKET
REGULATION HANDBOOK (2009).
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ing an individual instance where a claim was adjusted unreasonably, a policy was impermissibly cancelled or nonrenewed,
or an investigation was unreasonably delayed.308 Public entities
other than insurance regulators, such as attorneys general, often have little incentive to involve themselves in such cases.309
Finally, the judicial system would also be ill-equipped to
enforce minimum standards when competing regulators failed
to do so. Policyholders face various intractable obstacles to
bringing suit after they are denied coverage. Claimants have an
immediate need for cash and are generally risk averse, insurers
can (and do) ignore complaints until they mature into credible
litigation threats, and insurers enjoy significant strategic advantages from their repeat-player status.310 Moreover, the current alternative dispute resolution options are quite limited in
their effectiveness.311 Resort to judicial regulation is also very
difficult for regulatory issues that might arise outside of the
context of a claim denial, as these issues typically involve small
dollar amounts. Although class actions are sometimes available, often regulatory infractions are too case-specific to allow for
aggregated litigation.312
2. Legislative Opt-Out
Another potential approach to regulating a regulatory
market is to permit individual jurisdictions to opt out of the
scheme if they determine that it is producing excessively lax
regulation. Proponents of the SLS approach have suggested
that permitting such an opt-out would safeguard against the
risk that regulatory competition would produce excessive deregu308. Unlike other financial products, insurance payments are contingent
on idiosyncratic facts that are external to the contract itself. See Jackson, supra note 184, at 330.
309. This pattern does not hold when illegal practices are widespread, as in
the contingent-commission controversy. See Schwarcz, supra note 169, at 290.
310. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (providing the seminal
analysis of why repeat players tend to have an advantage in judicial proceedings); see also Schwarcz, supra note 129, at 741–50 (applying this analysis in
the insurance context).
311. See Schwarcz, supra note 129, at 788–99.
312. Most insurance-related class actions concern nonclaims issues, such as
the calculation of premiums or the selling of policies. See Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, The Tradeoffs Between Regulation and Litigation: Evidence from
Insurance Class Actions, 1 J. TORT L. 2 tbl.3 (2007) (collecting instances of insurance class actions in recent years). There are exceptions, like the nonoriginal equipment manufacturer parts class action. See id.
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lation.313 Under their proposal, a jurisdiction’s legislature
would need to opt out, the opt-out would only apply prospectively, and insurers would be permitted to exit any jurisdiction
that selected this option.314 Although fashioned as a specific
component of the SLS proposal, an opt-out could be extended to
an OFC scheme simply by permitting individual states to require that federally chartered insurers comply with all state insurance regulations.
Permitting jurisdictions to opt out of a scheme of regulatory competition would be unlikely to substantially reduce the
risk of excessive deregulation. The basic problem with this approach is that jurisdictions would be extremely unlikely to optout of a scheme of regulatory competition, as doing so would
disproportionately increase premiums in that jurisdiction. Opting-out would saddle a jurisdiction’s constituents not just with
the costs of enhanced regulation, but also with the costs of requiring all insurers to comply with a particular set of rules for
doing business in that state. Given the salience of insurance
prices,315 state legislatures would be unlikely to invoke this option even if they were displeased with the state of insurance
regulation.
Importantly, there is a key difference between the nonuniformity that characterizes the status quo and the nonuniformity that a state exercising a regulatory competition optout would create. In the status quo, regulators have gradually
developed (and continue to develop) numerous mechanisms for
reducing the costs to multistate insurers of complying with
multiple regulatory regimes.316 These mechanisms are designed
313. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 40.
314. See O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 21, at 10; Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 40; see generally Epstein, supra note 36.
315. See supra text accompanying notes 158–60.
316. State regulators have pursued an aggressive agenda in the last decade
to limit the structural problems created by a state regulatory system. For instance, they have formed an Interstate Insurance Compact through which life
insurers can seek product approval relatively quickly. See Interstate Ins. Prod.
Reg. Comm’n, http://www.insurancecompact.org/index.htm (last visited Mar.
19, 2010). They have automated the document submission process to regulators by developing a single electronic filing system used by all of the states.
See NAIC, System for Electronic Rate and Form Filing, http://www.serff.com/
index.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2010). They have coordinated the analysis of
market conduct data as well as certain targeted multistate investigations. See
generally Robert W. Klein & James Schacht, An Assessment of Insurance Market Conduct Surveillance, 20 J. INS. REG. 51 (2001). Currently, they are developing a process for accrediting different states’ market conduct regulations,
which should further decrease the costs to insurers of complying with multiple
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and operated by the state regulatory system as a whole,
through the NAIC.317 By contrast, any individual jurisdiction
that exercised a regulatory competition opt-out would not have
in place the infrastructure or developed procedures for reducing
the costs to multistate insurers of complying with a separate
regulatory regime for that state.
An additional and more straightforward problem with relying on a legislative opt-out to discipline regulatory competition
is that passing legislation is costly and difficult. Just as it is no
defense of the status quo system of insurance regulation that
state legislatures allow it to persist, so too would it be no defense of regulatory competition that state legislatures chose not
to opt out. Although the possibility of an opt-out might generate
some pressure for competing regulators to avoid large or salient
regulatory failures, regulatory competition might well produce
deregulatory costs that do not reach these thresholds.
B. SOLVENCY REGULATION, GUARANTEE FUNDS, AND MARKETBASED SAFEGUARDS
Guarantee funds are state-provided assurances that policyholders who are entitled to insurance proceeds will receive
payment up to a prespecified amount, even if their insurer is
financially unable to pay.318 In the status quo, every insurance
jurisdiction maintains a guarantee fund, which covers policyholders in that jurisdiction and which is funded by all insurers
licensed to do business in that jurisdiction.319 With one exception, these funds are funded on a postassessment basis, meaning that insurers only pay into the fund when, and if, a fellow
insurer is unable to fully pay policyholders.320 This funding
scheme may create some risk that a state will be unable to
raise sufficient revenue from insurers to fully pay large guarantee fund obligations.321 New York, by contrast, relies on ex
ante funding of its guarantee fund, meaning that it accumuregulatory regimes. See NAIC, Market Reg. and Consumer Aff. (D) Comm.,
http://www.naic.org/committees_d.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010). These are
only a small sampling of some of the most important efforts of the NAIC in the
last decade to coordinate the regulatory process. As noted earlier, the effectiveness of these programs can nonetheless legitimately be challenged. See supra note 41.
317. See Randall, supra note 1, at 634 –40.
318. See generally BAKER, supra note 138, at 683–93.
319. See KLEIN, supra note 234, at 164 –66.
320. See Grace & Scott, supra note 7, at 90.
321. See id.

2010]

AGAINST REGULATORY COMPETITION

1781

lates a pool of money from insurers before any guarantee fund
payments must be made.322 The central risk of such ex ante
funding is that it allows budget-strapped legislatures to siphon
off this money for general spending, as recently occurred in
New York.323
If properly incorporated into a scheme of regulatory competition, guarantee funds may improve the prospect that such
competition will produce reliable solvency regulation. First, a
guarantee fund can improve regulatory supply by acting as a
type of product warranty.324 If competing jurisdictions are required to guarantee policyholder payment when an insurer that
they regulate becomes insolvent, then those jurisdictions may
supply effective solvency regulation so as to avoid making payments from the guarantee fund.325 Of course, this incentive is
hardly perfect, as the political actors who set regulatory policy
will not fully internalize that expected cost of paying a guarantee. But these actors will at least face some political pressures
from within their jurisdictions to limit this contingent risk.326
Second, guarantee funds may also improve regulatory demand if the insurers who select a competing regulator are required to contribute to the cost of that regulator’s guarantee
payments. In that event, insurers may demand a strong solvency regulator so as to reduce expected payouts to fund guarantee
payments stemming from other insurers’ insolvencies. This
would be especially likely if the fund were funded through ex
post assessments, as the size of that assessment would directly
correlate to the actual losses produced by an insurer’s insolvency.327 However, an ex ante funding approach can also improve
insurer demand so long as the premiums that insurers pay into
the fund reflect a fair assessment of the expected cost of future
insolvencies. Historically, though, states have done a poor job

322. See id.
323. See id.
324. See Bert Ely, The Fate of the State Guaranty Funds After the Advent of
Federal Insurance Chartering, in OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTERING AND REGULATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES, supra note 4, at 135, 137–38.
325. See id.
326. See id.
327. Although it is easier to charge firms for the actual costs of insolvencies
in a post-assessment scheme, insurers that embrace a risky strategy may discount this cost based on the prospect that they will be the firm that becomes
insolvent.
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setting appropriate ex ante premiums in such circumstances.328
One alternative is to require insurers to issue bonds that essentially mimic state guarantee funds. Because the price of these
bonds would reflect market estimates of the expected costs of
guarantee fund payments, they would do a better job of setting
prices correctly than a state-set premium.
Unfortunately, neither guarantee funds nor market-based
substitutes are likely to improve regulatory competition. In
both an OFC and an SLS scheme, the key problem is that
guarantee funds would either be unstable or would be poorly
designed. Moreover, market-based substitutes for guarantee
funds would be practically unworkable.
1. Guarantee Funds and the OFC
There are three basic ways that such guarantee funds
could be structured in an OFC scheme.329 First, an exclusive
federal guarantee system would require all insurers, irrespective of whether they opted for state or federal regulation, to
participate in a new federal guarantee fund. This approach
would replicate the FDIC scheme in banking.330 Second, an exclusive state guarantee system would retain the current scheme
of state-provided guarantee funds and require that all insurers
opting for a federal charter continue their participation in these
state guarantee funds. This would maintain the status quo approach despite the addition of a federal option. Finally, a dual
guarantee system would require insurers that opted for a federal charter to participate in a new federal guarantee fund, but
mandate that insurers regulated at the state level continue
their participation in state funds.
Neither of the first two options—an exclusive federal guarantee system or an exclusive state guarantee system—would
effectively discipline regulatory competition. First, neither of
328. See David Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, Extending the Theory to Meet
the Practice, in PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 1, 34 (Robert E. Litan & Richard Herring eds., 2004) (“A common but troubling phenomenon is severe
underpricing of risk coverage by the public sector, often because premiums are
insufficiently responsive to risk differentials. . . . When politics and political
pressures intrude, it is often impossible to impose significant differential rates
for insurance.”).
329. See Grace & Scott, supra note 7, at 89–91 (providing an overview of
guarantee funds and how they could be adjusted in an OFC scheme so as not
to sever the link between regulation and guarantee, which operates as a product warranty). See generally Ely, supra note 324.
330. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 61, at 310–15, 326.
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these schemes would improve regulatory supply by acting as an
effective product warranty. The basic problem with both
schemes is that they would require one of the two suppliers of
regulation to provide a warranty not just for its own regulation,
but also for the solvency regulation of the other scheme. This
would accomplish precisely the opposite goal of the guarantee
fund as a product warranty, creating a moral hazard for whichever regulatory scheme did not supply the guarantee fund.331
Indeed, commentators have argued that an analogous mismatch between deposit insurance and banking regulation (the
FDIC insures even state-chartered banks) induces excessively
lax safety and soundness regulation at the state level.332
Second, neither an exclusive state or federal guarantee scheme
would improve regulatory demand. Both approaches would sever the link between an insurer’s responsibility for funding
guarantees and its selection among competing regulators. As a
result, insurers would disregard their expected contributions to
guarantee funds in choosing among competing regulators.
By contrast, while the third option of a dual guarantee system is theoretically attractive, it is practically unworkable. In
theory, a dual guarantee system could promote effective regulatory competition with respect to solvency regulation: it might
force regulators to provide a “warranty” for their solvency regulation and it would attempt to tether insurers’ regulatory choices
to their responsibility to pay guarantee fund costs. Unfortunately, the state guarantee funds in a dual guarantee scheme
would be unreliable. First, the separate existence of a federal
guarantee scheme would inherently raise the prospect that the
federal government would bail out state guarantee funds that
were unable to pay their claims. Indeed, this is exactly what
happened historically in the banking context, with state deposit
331. See Ely, supra note 324, at 137–38. In an exclusive federal guarantee
scheme, state jurisdictions would not bear the costs of inadequate solvency
regulation, whereas in an exclusive state guarantee scheme, federal regulators
would not bear the costs of insufficient federal solvency regulation. It is likely
that the moral hazard generated by an exclusive state guarantee system
would be less than that generated by an exclusive federal guarantee scheme,
as federal regulators might have a strong interest in preventing states from
funding the costs of insurer insolvencies.
332. See Butler & Macey, supra note 98, at 712–17. In fact, the problem
would be even worse in an OFC, as the FDIC has various regulatory powers to
shut down a bank that falls below certain minimum capital requirements;
OFC proposals that lodge the guarantee system at the federal level do not entrust that guarantee scheme with powers analogous to the FDIC’s powers in
banking.
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insurance funds consistently failing and requiring federal bailouts.333 Second, state-licensed insurers would inevitably resist
paying postassessment fees to fund guarantee fund payments.
The key problem, from the perspective of state-licensed insurers, would be that they would not be able to pass these costs on
to consumers (as in the status quo) because federally chartered
insurers operating in the state, against whom they compete,
would not be obliged to pay these assessments. Third, the number of insurers that would be available to tax on a postassessment basis would be variable, changing as state-licensed
insurers shifted their charter to the federal level. A state that
insisted on postassessment funding would thus have substantially less certainty than in the status quo about how much it
would need to assess insurers in order to fund guaranteed
payments.
2. Guarantee Funds, the SLS, and Solvency Bonds
The only sensible way to structure guarantee funds in an
SLS scheme of regulatory competition would be to require
every state that issues charters to provide a financial guarantee for those insurers, irrespective of where policyholders are
located. This approach to guarantee funds would maintain the
link between regulation and the guarantee fund that is critical
to the notion of a guarantee system as a warranty. But it would
be even less reliable than state guarantee funds in an OFC
scheme. The key problem is that a single state could be on the
hook for all of the losses associated with an insolvency, and it
could only look to the insurers chartered in its state (as opposed
to those who are licensed to do business in the state) to help
pay for the costs of that insolvency. In most cases, states will
simply be unable or unwilling to raise the funds to pay for such
guarantees, especially if they are large.
Recognizing this limitation of state guarantee funds in an
SLS scheme, proponents of the SLS have proposed that insurers could be required to issue “solvency bonds,” which are a
specific type of risk-linked security.334 Solvency bonds would be
sold to investors in capital markets.335 In the event that the
guarantee fund of the insurer’s selected state regulator failed,
the investors’ principal would be used to make up for the state

333. See DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS 117, 119–20 (2002).
334. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 4, at 40.
335. Id.
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guarantee fund’s default.336 If, on the other hand, the guarantee fund of the insurer’s chosen regulator did not default within
the bond’s time period, then investors’ principal would be returned.337 In exchange for taking on the risk of losing their
principal, investors would be compensated by marketdetermined rates of return.338 The key idea behind this proposal is that the rate of return that investors demanded would reflect the risk that a state’s guarantee fund would fail.339 This,
in turn, would lead insurers to seek out state regulators whose
guarantee funds were unlikely to fail because they maintain effective solvency regulation.340 Doing so would reduce the rate
that insurers would need to pay on these bonds.341
Unfortunately, it is highly unlikely that capital markets
would have anywhere near a sufficient appetite for purchasing
these solvency bonds at a reasonable rate of return. The most
natural comparison to a solvency bond is a catastrophe bond,
which is also a risk-linked bond. A catastrophe bond is a reinsurance substitute for insurers.342 Catastrophe bonds are virtually identical to solvency bonds, except that the triggering
event for payout of investors’ principal is based on some measure of the size of insured losses from a single event.343 Catastrophe bonds were first introduced into the marketplace in the
mid-1990s. Since then, insurers have often had difficulty finding investors willing to purchase these bonds.344 Prior to 2004,
no more than nine catastrophe bonds have been issued in a given year. In recent years, these numbers have increased substantially. Yet even in 2007, which saw a record number of new
issuances of catastrophe bonds, only twenty-nine bonds were
336. See id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. See id.
341. See id.
342. See generally Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Terrorism Losses
and All Perils Insurance, 23 J. INS. REG. 3 (2005).
343. There are three actual triggers—one based entirely on size of sponsoring entity’s losses, one based on an index (usually of industry losses), and one
that blends these two triggers. See J. David Cummins, Cat Bonds and Other
Risk-Linked Securities: State of the Market and Recent Developments, 11 RISK
MGMT. & INS. REV. 23, 27 (2008).
344. See Martin F. Grace et al., Regulating Onshore Special Purpose Reinsurance Vehicles, 19 J. INS. REG. 551, 557 (2001) (noting that, as of 2001, “almost 60 [cat bond] transactions totaling nearly $7 billion hav[e] been completed since 1994”).
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issued.345 In 2008, the number of new issues fell dramatically to
only eleven, though it appears that that number rebounded in
2009.346 In sum, the catastrophe bond market evolved slowly,
over more than a decade, and remains cyclical.347 The reason,
most agree, is due to uneven investor interest in these instruments.
This slowly evolving interest in catastrophe bonds may, at
first glance, signal that a robust market for solvency bonds
could emerge over time, as investors familiarized themselves
with these bonds and their components became relatively standardized. But this would be a mistake. Solvency bonds are, in
fact, likely to prove much less enticing to investors than catastrophe bonds. First, and most importantly, the key selling point
of catastrophe bonds for investors is that the triggering event is
not linked to market risk: whether a hurricane hits Florida has
nothing to do with the performance of the Dow in the present
year.348 This makes catastrophe bonds a good diversification
mechanism, which is important given that these bonds (like
solvency bonds) place the investors’ entire principal at risk for
a contractually specified period of time.349
By contrast, investor risk in solvency bonds would manifestly not be independent of market conditions. Market conditions correlate very well with the risk of insurer insolvency, as
insurers make a large percentage of their money from investing
the floats on their premiums.350 Insurer insolvencies are consequently much more likely when the market is performing poorly.351 And this means that the failure of a state’s guarantee
fund, which would need to pay policyholders of a failed insurer,
would also be clearly linked to overall market conditions. Completing the reasoning, the payout on solvency bonds would also
be correlated to market risk. As a result, solvency bonds are
likely to be much less attractive to investors than catastrophe
bonds.
345. See Cummins, supra note 343, at 32.
346. See Guy Carpenter, Cat Bonds Persevere in Tumultuous Market, CAPITALIDEAS.COM, Feb. 4, 2009, http://www.gccapitalideas.com/2009/02/04/cat
-bonds-persevere-in-tumultuous-market/.
347. Id.
348. See Cummins, supra note 343, at 24 –27.
349. See id.
350. See Jeffrey Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liability and Insurance After Three Decades of Dispute, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 349, 357
(2006).
351. Id.
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An additional reason that investors are unlikely to have
much interest in solvency bonds is that they present a substantial amount of moral hazard. A key component of catastrophe
bonds is that the triggering event and the requisite payout
cannot be influenced by the actions of the issuer. Thus, most
catastrophe bonds base payouts on indices that are not generally impacted by the particular issuer’s payouts in the event of a
catastrophe.352 By contrast, solvency bonds would undoubtedly
involve a great degree of moral hazard that could not be contracted away. The key problem is that states would be more inclined to default on their guarantee fund obligations—
especially in the event of a large loss—if they knew that investors in solvency bonds would pick up the tab. Although this
might limit their capacity to compete in the market to attract
insurers in the future, that may appear to be a small price to
pay in exchange for allowing anonymous investors, rather than
state taxpayers, to pay out-of-state policyholders of failed insurers.
There are over ten thousand insurers in the United
States.353 After a decade, the catastrophe bond market—which
enjoys massive advantages over solvency bonds from an investor demand standpoint—has managed to produce about thirty
bond issuances a year.354 These issuances have been from only
the largest national and international insurers.355 As these
numbers suggest, requiring all insurers to issue solvency bonds
is simply unworkable.
CONCLUSION
Any fair evaluation of the present state-based system of insurance regulation must acknowledge that there continue to be
substantial inefficiencies in the regulatory process. Appropriate
reform could substantially improve this regulatory system, and
thus enhance the efficiency and fairness of insurance markets.
But this Article has raised substantial doubts about whether
reforms that enhance regulatory competition would achieve
this outcome. In particular, it has argued that regulatory competition would ultimately undermine the content of insurance

352.
353.
(2009).
354.
355.

See Cummins, supra note 343, at 27–28.
See generally INS. INFO. INST., THE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 2009
See Cummins, supra note 343, at 32.
See id. at 39–40.
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law and regulation, harming consumers, third parties, and insurers themselves.
To be sure, this Article’s scope is limited, and it does not
analyze several important issues that are relevant to the
broader insurance regulatory reform debate. In particular, it
does not consider the duplicative and overlapping nature of
state insurance regulation. Although the extent of this problem
is debatable,356 those inclined to believe it is large may conclude that the benefits of a scheme such as the OFC, which allow insurers to select a single regulator and only creates limited regulatory competition, outweigh the costs identified
herein.
However, this framing presents a false choice. Various reforms would limit the duplicative nature of state insurance
regulation while avoiding enhanced regulatory competition.
These include proposals to create a single federal insurance
regulator, to empower a federal agency to coordinate state regulation, or to require that all multistate insurers be subject to
national regulation.357 Reform-minded scholars and advocates
should focus their efforts on these options rather than embracing regulatory competition in insurance.

356. See supra text accompanying notes 312–16 (describing state efforts to
reduce the costs of complying with multiple state regulatory schemes).
357. See infra Part I.A.

